Incident Overview
Aeroflot Flight SU892, operating a service from Minsk to Berlin, was diverted to Prague-Ruzyne due to poor weather at Berlin. After an uneventful flight from Prague, the crew began a descent to Berlin-Schönefeld Airport. Weather conditions at the time were marginal, with visibility limited to 900 meters and a ceiling of 60 meters.
Approach and ATC Communication
The crew received clearance for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 25L. Air Traffic Control (ATC) activated the lighting system for runway 25R while informing all crews that runway 25R was closed due to work in progress. These transmissions were made in English. A misinterpretation of the situation led the crew to continue the approach toward runway 25R instead of the assigned runway 25L.
Events on Short Final
On short final, ATC noticed the aircraft's incorrect position and instructed the crew to execute a left turn to realign with the runway 25L approach path. The captain initiated the left turn with flaps extended at 38° and a speed of 263 km/h. During the turn, the aircraft descended below the glide path, achieving a rate of descent of 7 meters per second. The aircraft struck tree tops, stalled, and subsequently crashed in a wooded area located 3 kilometers short of the runway threshold. The impact was followed by a fire.
Casualties and Injuries
The accident resulted in 70 fatalities among the occupants. Additionally, 12 passengers were seriously injured. Two weeks after the crash, two of the survivors died from their injuries.
Official Findings
The investigation determined that the instructions transmitted by ATC on short final were unexpected by the flight crew, leading to wrong decisions. Because another aircraft from the Hungarian carrier Malev was also approaching Berlin, ATC messages were transmitted in English on the frequency. Certain elements of the different messages were misinterpreted by the Soviet crew members. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Lack of crew coordination.
- Absence of cross-checks and mutual controls in various actions.
- Difficulties in understanding English phraseology.
- Lack of knowledge and experience in applying rules related to radio transmissions during international flights.
Considering the situation, the captain should have taken the decision to initiate a go-around procedure, as all safety conditions were clearly not met.