What happened
On the night of October 26, a scheduled domestic flight operated from Turnhouse Airport in Edinburgh toward London Heathrow Airport. The flight proceeded normally until reaching the Garston VOR holding point. At approximately 00:15, the captain initiated an approach to runway 28R, where visibility was limited to a reported RVR of 350 meters. During this attempt, the pilot-in-command sought visual references while the co-pilot followed the ILS approach under radar monitoring. The captain subsequently reported an overshoot and transitioned to runway 28L, which offered slightly better visibility at 500 meters.
Following the initial unsuccessful attempts, the crew requested to enter a holding pattern at the Garston point. After observing another Vanguard successfully land on runway 28R, the pilot-in-command requested another approach to the same runway at 01:18, despite no significant improvement in weather conditions. During this final monitored ILS approach, the aircraft was tracking the centerline approximately 3/4 of a mile from the threshold. However, twenty-two seconds later, the crew reported an overshoot.
In the attempt to recover, the co-pilot applied abrupt rotation while the captain incorrectly selected the 5-degree flap setting instead of 20 degrees. As the aircraft's speed increased to 137 knots, the vertical speed indicator suggested a climb of 850 feet per minute, leading the co-pilot to push the nose down. This resulted in a steep dive, and the Vanguard struck the runway approximately 2600 feet from the threshold. There were no survivors reported in this specific sequence of events.
Findings
The investigation concluded that the accident was driven by pilot error resulting from several intersecting factors. The crew faced extreme environmental challenges, including low visibility of less, than 50 meters, and heavy fog. Contributing elements included pilot fatigue, anxiety, and spatial disorientation. The findings also highlighted a lack of experience regarding overshoot procedures in dense fog, an over-reliance on pressure instruments that were providing misleading data, and deficiencies in training. Additionally, the mechanical design of the flap selector and the incorrect flap setting played critical roles in the loss of control.