What happened
The incident began with a flight instructor electing to demonstrate a no-flap takeoff operation. The conditions were characterized by calm and glassy water, which can present unique challenges for floatplane operations due to reduced visual references and potential hydrodynamic effects.
As the floatplane accelerated along the water surface, it reached a speed of approximately 55 to 60 knots without becoming airborne. Recognizing that the aircraft was not gaining altitude as expected, the instructor made the decision to abort the takeoff. During this critical phase, he attempted to execute a left turn to avoid obstacles or align with a safe path.
However, the floatplane settled off its step, meaning it lost the hydrodynamic lift provided by the planing surface and began to drag in the water. Despite the forward momentum carrying the aircraft straight ahead, the instructor called for "rudders." In this context, he intended for the student pilot to apply the water rudders, which are steering devices located on the floats themselves.
The student pilot, however, interpreted the command as a request to apply normal air rudder pedals. This misunderstanding delayed the application of the correct steering mechanism. The handle controlling the water rudders was positioned at the lower left corner of the instrument panel. Because the instructor was seated in the right seat, he did not have physical access to this control.
Consequently, the floatplane continued its forward trajectory with insufficient directional control. It impacted an embankment while the engine was shut down. The estimated speed at the time of impact was between 7 and 10 knots. Following the event, the instructor acknowledged that his communication should have been more specific, explicitly stating "water rudders" to ensure the student understood the required action.
The investigation
The investigation focused on the sequence of events during the aborted takeoff. Key findings included the failure of the floatplane to become airborne at the expected speed during a no-flap configuration. The physical layout of the cockpit was also examined, specifically the location of the water rudder handle relative to the instructor's seat.
Findings
Several factors contributed to the accident. The primary issue was the failure to become airborne during the takeoff roll, which necessitated an abort. During the abort, the floatplane settled off step, reducing maneuverability and increasing drag.
A significant contributing factor was the miscommunication between the instructor and the student. The instructor's use of the term "rudders" was ambiguous in this specific context, leading the student to apply air rudder instead of water rudder. This error occurred because the water rudder control was not accessible to the instructor from his seated position.
The combination of these factors resulted in the floatplane impacting an embankment at low speed. The instructor's post-accident statement confirmed that clearer communication regarding the specific type of rudder required would have likely prevented the mishap.