Casualties unknown

Uncontained Failure of HPT Stage 1 Disk During Engine Test (N330AA)

Los Angeles, CA, US

On June 2, 2006, a Boeing 767-223(ER) (registration N330AA) operated by American Airlines Inc was involved in an aviation accident near Los Angeles, CA. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The HPT stage 1 disk failed from an intergranular fatigue crack that originated from a small depression on the blade slot bottom aft corner radius. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive; 13 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 2026-06-10Data APIEditorial standards
Boeing 767-223(ER)
Photo: Tosaka / CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

During a high-power test on a Boeing 767's left engine, the HPT stage 1 disk failed uncontainedly due to intergranular fatigue cracking originating from depressions on blade slot radii. Investigation revealed inspection directives lacked timely compliance schedules.

Event Description

A Boeing 767 was undergoing a high-power test of its left-hand General Electric CF6-80C2 engine to troubleshoot a reported inability to achieve climb thrust. During the test, the engine experienced an uncontained failure of the high pressure turbine (HPT) stage 1 disk.

Examination Findings

Examination of the disk fragments revealed that the disk failed from an intergranular fatigue crack. This crack originated from a small depression located on the bottom aft corner radius of a blade slot. Additionally, two other intergranular fatigue cracks were found, also originating from small depressions on the bottom aft corner radii of other blade slots. Intergranular fatigue cracks are typically associated with very high stresses exceeding the material's capability.

Previous Directives and Recommendations

General Electric issued service bulletins (SB) requiring inspections of CF6-80A and -80C2 HPT stage 1 disks, which the Federal Aviation Administration mandated with airworthiness directives (AD). However, the initial SBs and AD did not establish a compliance schedule. When subsequently revised to include a compliance schedule, the schedule permitted disks with significantly higher cycles since new—compared to those that had previously failed or were found cracked—to remain in service. On August 26, 2006, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations A-06-60 through A-06-64 to address these deficiencies.

Probable cause

The HPT stage 1 disk failed from an intergranular fatigue crack that originated from a small depression on the blade slot bottom aft corner radius.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20060809X01126. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.