What happened
On July 5, 2008, at 8:36 p.m. EDT, a near midair collision occurred at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) involving two aircraft operating under instrument flight rules in visual meteorological conditions. The first aircraft, a Boeing 737-300 operating as Cayman Airways flight 792 (VP-CKW), was cleared to land on runway 22L. The second aircraft, a Boeing 767-300 operating as Linea Aerea Nacional de Chile flight 533, was cleared for takeoff on runway 13R.
As the Cayman Airways flight was on approach, the local controller instructed the crew to perform a quick left turn to heading 090 to avoid traffic on the departure roll. During this maneuver, the aircraft was instructed to maintain an altitude of 1,000 feet, which was below the minimum vectoring altitude of 1,400 feet for that area. The crew subsequently transitioned to New York TRACON and landed successfully on a second approach attempt after reporting they were high on the approach. There were no injuries and no damage to either aircraft.
The investigation
The investigation was initiated following a press inquiry on July 7, 2008. Investigators reviewed radar data from the ASR-9 system, radio communications, and interviewed air traffic controllers and the air traffic manager.
Radar analysis revealed that the minimum lateral separation between the two aircraft was 0.57 nautical miles, with a vertical separation of 200 feet. The investigation also noted that the instruction to maintain 1,000 feet resulted in less-than-standard terrain and obstacle separation. Furthermore, a second, similar incident involving different aircraft occurred at the same facility on July 11, 2008, prompting the termination of converging operations at JFK pending a procedural review.
Findings
- The aircraft were operating on non-intersecting runways where flight paths intersect.
- The altitude clearance of 1,000 feet for the arriving aircraft was below the minimum vectoring altitude of 1,400 feet.
- The altitude instruction was consistent with the facility's standard operating procedures for go-arounds, suggesting the error was related to facility procedures rather than individual controller performance.