History of Flight
On August 6, 2011, at 1700 Eastern Daylight Time, a Piper PA-46-310P, registration N469CC, was substantially damaged during a forced landing at Curtis L. Brown Field Airport (EYF) in Elizabethtown, North Carolina. The airline transport pilot and passenger were uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal local flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
The pilot reported departing EYF after topping off the fuel tanks. While climbing through approximately 1,100 feet above mean sea level and turning from the crosswind leg to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, the engine began making a whining sound. The pilot moved the throttle but the engine did not respond, lost power, and the airplane started descending. The pilot turned toward the runway, feathered the propeller, and kept the landing gear retracted until the last second to ensure reaching the runway. Upon selecting gear down, the landing gear did not fully extend before touchdown, and the airplane skidded on its belly down the runway before coming to rest.
Personnel Information
According to FAA records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and sea, multi-engine land, and instrument. He also held flight instructor ratings for single-engine and instrument. His most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on March 22, 2011. He reported 4,930 total flight hours, with 326 hours in make and model.
Aircraft Information
The accident aircraft was a six-seat, single-engine, low-wing, pressurized airplane of conventional metal construction, originally manufactured by Piper Aircraft in 1984 as a PA-46-310P. It was equipped with retractable landing gear and was the third airplane converted to a JetProp DLX, having its original engine replaced in 1998 with a 580-shaft-horsepower Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-34 turboprop engine.
The airplane had experienced three prior propeller strikes. The first occurred before the company purchased the airplane, the second when it was accidentally taxied into a ditch, and the third when it was taxied over uneven pavement at Lakefront Airport (NEW) in New Orleans, Louisiana. After the third strike, the airplane was out of service for approximately four months before being repaired and returned to service on February 28, 2011. The most recent annual inspection was completed on March 24, 2011. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accrued 5,696.3 total hours of operation.
Meteorological Information
The reported weather at EYF at 1655 included winds from 190 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 3,200 and 3,800 feet, temperature 32°C, dew point 23°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.91 inches of mercury.
Airport Information
Curtis L. Brown Field was an uncontrolled airport with one runway, 15/33, asphalt in good condition, measuring 4,998 by 75 feet. The runway was equipped with medium-intensity edge lights and non-precision markings. A 2-light precision approach path indicator on the left side of runway 15 displayed a 4.20-degree glide path. Obstructions included a 6-foot fence 248 feet from the runway and 192 feet left of centerline, requiring an 8:1 slope to clear.
Wreckage and Impact
Post-accident examination revealed that the bottom of the airplane contacted the runway after the landing gear collapsed during the forced landing. Two of the four propeller blades had curled tips, scrap marks, and holes worn through. The nose gear tire was flat, and the nose gear doors were bent, scraped, and worn through in several areas. Antennas mounted aft of the nose gear doors were ground down. An approximately 12-by-24-inch area on the belly beneath the cabin entrance door was worn through to the pressure vessel structure, which was substantially damaged.
The engine showed no visible damage, no metal particles in the exhaust, no fuel or oil leaks. When motored, the compressor turned freely with no indication of drag, blade rub, or bearing drag. Airflow and fuel smell were observed from the exhaust, and turbine rotation was confirmed. Fuel discharged from the combustion case drain, and the start valve was confirmed closed.
Engine Examination and Testing
The engine was removed and shipped to Pratt & Whitney Canada's facility in St. Hubert, Quebec for examination. Inspection of the engine, gearbox housing, accessories, exhaust duct, and power turbine revealed no evidence of pre-impact failures or malfunctions. The propeller shaft was intact and could be rotated freely.
Examination of the fuel control unit manual override revealed an unapproved field modification: the manual override input lever was lockwired to restrict travel from idle to approximately 1/4 inch from the maximum stop, which would prevent the engine from producing full rated power when using manual override. The input lever airframe connection was also modified with a rough countersink. The set screw lockwire lead seal was in place and undisturbed.
Pneumatic line anomalies were found. The compressor discharge air (P3) line was continuous but its gas generator case fitting bolts were not lockwired. The power turbine control (Py) line propeller governor fitting lockwire was fractured at the loop through the B-nut hole, with the nut backed off approximately 1/3 to 1/2 turn, allowing the line to move by hand. Macroscopic inspection showed the fracture was characteristic of overload at a pre-existing nick, with no fatigue. The forward fire seal fitting lockwire was overstressed and nicked.
During a functional test, initial start showed the gas generator speed (Ng) and fuel flow stabilizing at minimum values with no response to power lever movement. After the Py line fitting was tightened, the engine started and accelerated normally. All handling checks were normal. When the Py line fitting was loosened approximately 1/3 turn, Ng fell to sub-idle.
Engine history indicated that after the third propeller strike, the engine was removed, disassembled, and the power and compressor sections were overhauled. After reinstallation, a third mechanic rigged the beta system and fuel controller with assistance from Rocket Engineering. The origin of the pre-existing nick, the travel-limiting lockwire, and the countersinking of the input lever could not be determined.
Additional Information
The pilot did not attempt to use the manual override switch during the power loss. The Pilot's Operating Handbook for the JetProp DLX referenced the manual override only in the Engine Surges section, advising actuation if surges became excessive or the engine went to idle. The pilot was unsure if fuel system icing inhibitor (FSII) was used; the POH contained no reference to FSII and the airplane had no fuel heaters. Fuel samples from the wing tanks, header tank, and engine case drain contained water and contaminants.
Following the accident, the supplemental type certificate holder made changes: clarified the manual override usage in the POH, added a requirement for FSII, and added placards requiring FSII at fuel filler ports.