Accident Overview
On November 19, 2011, at approximately 1135 eastern standard time, an Ercoupe 415-C, registration N99168, was substantially damaged during a forced landing shortly after takeoff from South Lakeland Airport (X49) in Mulberry, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight under 14 CFR Part 91, destined for Albert Whitted Airport (SPG) in St. Petersburg, Florida. The sport pilot sustained minor injuries, and the passenger sustained serious injuries due to burns. The flight had originated about 5 minutes earlier from X49.
Pilot and Passenger Statements
The pilot reported that earlier that day he flew uneventfully from Punta Gorda, Florida, to X49. After landing, he secured the engine and remained on the ground for about 2 hours; no fuel or maintenance was performed at X49. While on the ground, he received a call and decided to return to PGD rather than fly to SPG as planned. He was asked if he could take a passenger to SPG, agreed, and both boarded the airplane. The pilot was in the left seat; the passenger in the right.
The pilot stated that because the airplane was parked on soft grass, he needed extra power to get out of ruts. He taxied to runway 14, with other airplanes departing ahead. Wind was from the east at 8 to 10 knots. Due to the short ground time and the uneventful prior flight, he did not perform an engine run-up. He estimated 16 gallons of fuel on board at engine start. He rolled onto the runway, applied brakes, added full power, and began the takeoff roll. The airplane accelerated slower than expected, which he attributed to the grass surface. The takeoff roll was about 1,000 feet (typical 500-600 feet), with about 2,000 feet of runway remaining. The airplane became airborne at 60 mph, with the rotation point farther down the runway than usual.
The pilot climbed to about 400 feet, cleared power lines, then the airplane began descending. He saw trees ahead and maneuvered toward a clearing, but while descending, the right wing collided with a tree, spinning the airplane to the right. The airplane hit the ground right wing low, causing a postcrash fire on the right side. Both occupants unbuckled their lap belts and exited.
The passenger stated he had planned to fly to SPG in another airplane but was declined due to weight and balance. The accident pilot offered to fly him. The passenger did not notice a preflight inspection and asked about it; the pilot replied he knew the airplane better than anyone. The passenger was not briefed on the lap belt, which he found fastened but loose. The pilot did not ask his weight or perform weight and balance calculations. The passenger noted the pilot grabbed a card with handwriting and threw it in the back before engine start.
The passenger reported the pilot applied ¾ throttle to exit the parking spot, which seemed excessive. During taxi, two other airplanes performed engine run-ups; the passenger questioned the need for one, but the pilot said it was unnecessary because he had just landed 2 hours earlier and knew the airplane. The pilot performed a rolling takeoff. About halfway down the runway, the airplane was not airborne; the passenger thought the pilot should have aborted. About ¾ down the runway, the nose gear remained on the ground, and the airplane felt light. The pilot quickly pulled and pushed the control yoke, then pulled very quickly. The airplane became airborne with slowly rocking wings. It climbed slowly, with a nose-high angle of attack but little climb. Over Highway 60, the pilot said "woops"; the passenger glanced at the airspeed indicator, seeing 70 mph, then rapidly decreasing to 40 mph. The airplane impacted a tree on the right side, yawed right, then hit the ground nose-low. The passenger lost consciousness briefly and awoke with fire around him. He struggled with the unfamiliar lap belt buckle; the webbing may have been destroyed by fire, allowing him to exit. He ran to a road and asked a bystander for help.
The passenger was airlifted to Tampa General Hospital for burn treatment. The pilot visited him; during the visit, the passenger asked why no engine run-up was performed. The pilot replied he was trained that a run-up was needed only once a day regardless of flight number. The passenger's mother reported the pilot said he "should have aborted the takeoff and doesn't know why he didn't."
The passenger did not perceive any change in engine sound from takeoff power to impact, nor any sputtering except during initial engine start. He stated a witness said the airplane climbed no higher than nearby power lines.
Witness Observations
A witness, an airframe and powerplant mechanic located about 100 yards from the departure end of runway 14, heard the engine during taxi but could not clearly hear an engine run-up. He observed the airplane at the departure end in a slight climb attitude, about the height of power lines. He did not hear sputtering but believed the engine was not developing full power because the airplane should have been higher. He stated he did not hear any engine malfunction, though the engine sound differed from other Ercoupe airplanes he had heard. The airplane appeared to climb little between the runway end and power lines, maintaining a flat attitude. He did not see smoke trailing. He later heard about the accident and proceeded to the site with a fire extinguisher.
Post-Accident Examination
Following recovery, the thermally damaged engine was examined by an FAA airworthiness inspector. Hand rotation of the propeller revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Cold differential compression testing (80 psi) showed cylinders 1, 3, and 4 tested 0, while cylinder 2 held 70 psi. The oil filter had no contaminants. Both magnetos were properly timed; the left magneto produced spark on all leads, but the right magneto did not produce spark from any lead. The right magneto had corrosion throughout, with a burned and fractured wire. The right magneto was retained for further examination.
At an FAA-certified repair station, the right magneto (Eisemann LA-4, serial 46-40767) was tested and produced no spark. Disassembly revealed extensive internal corrosion, excessive dirt, corroded points, and a burned wire with exposed conductor.
Maintenance records recovered from the wreckage were heavily fire damaged. The airplane empty weight was 839.1 pounds with an arm of 25.8 inches. Gross weight was listed as 1,320 pounds, and CG range 26.4 to 30.3 inches.
Weight and Balance
Weight and balance calculations used the airplane empty weight (839.1 lbs, moment 21,648.78), pilot weight per his interview (200 lbs), passenger weight (155 lbs), fuel (16 gallons or 96 lbs of 100LL), and oil (8 lbs). This gave a gross weight at engine start of approximately 1,298 pounds and a CG of 28.55 inches. Using the pilot weight reported by the FAA inspector (230 lbs) resulted in a gross weight of approximately 1,328 pounds.
The last annual inspection was completed on December 14, 2010, with total time and tachometer time of about 1,963 and 1,025 hours, respectively.
Medical Certification
During an interview 4 days after the accident, the pilot was asked if the FAA had ever denied his medical application; he replied no. According to FAA Aeromedical Certification Division records, the pilot's last special issuance medical certificate was dated June 14, 2006, not valid after June 30, 2007. In November 2006, he received a third-class Special Issuance Authorization expiring June 30, 2012, contingent on submitting medical reports at 12-month intervals. No new medical information was received after 2006, so in August 2006, the FAA Administrator issued a final denial because he did not meet medical standards. Under 14 CFR Part 61.23, a sport pilot must possess a medical certificate or a U.S. driver's license (if not denied special issuance). The pilot submitted an affidavit stating his logbook was lost or destroyed in the fire; he reported his flight review was current but could not contact the instructor who gave it.