1 fatality

18 Dec 2013: BEECH A36TC (N3705Z) — GREGORY VOIT — Chatlottesville, VA

Chatlottesville, VA, United States
SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On December 18, 2013, a Beech A36TC (N3705Z) crashed while on approach to Charlottesville-Albemarle Airport, Virginia. The pilot reported engine failure and was fatally injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged.

Accident Overview

On December 18, 2013, at approximately 1110 eastern standard time, a Beech A36TC, registration N3705Z, was substantially damaged when it struck terrain near Charlottesville, Virginia. The aircraft was on approach to Charlottesville-Albemarle Airport (CHO) after departing Woodbine, New Jersey. The commercial pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions were present, and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. The flight was conducted under Part 91.

Pilot Information

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument ratings. His most recent second-class medical certificate was issued in June 2013, at which time he reported 2,185 total flight hours, with 32 hours in the preceding six months. The pilot's logbook was not recovered.

Aircraft Information

The 1980 Beech A36TC was a six-seat, low-wing, retractable tricycle gear aircraft, serial number EA-146. It was powered by a Continental TSIO-520 engine (300 horsepower) driving a three-blade Hartzell constant-speed propeller. The most recent annual inspection was completed on November 23, 2013, with total airframe time of 5,554.6 hours and engine time of 863.6 hours since factory rebuild. The pilot purchased the aircraft in 2002.

Flight History

The pilot contacted CHO tower at 1104, reporting 13 miles from the airport at 4,300 feet mean sea level. He was instructed to enter a left base leg for runway 21. At 1108, the pilot declared an emergency, stating his engine was "dying." The controller asked about occupants and fuel; the pilot reported one person and 2 hours of fuel. The last transmission at 1110 indicated he would not reach the airport.

Weather

The 1118 weather observation at CHO recorded wind from 230 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear sky, temperature 4°C, dewpoint -8°C, and altimeter 30.17 inches of mercury.

Wreckage and Impact

The accident site was located about 3 miles east of CHO in front of a residence. Initial impact was marked by damaged tree limbs, with a wreckage path approximately 200 feet long oriented roughly 090 degrees magnetic. Browning vegetation was observed along the path. Fragments of the outboard right and left wings were scattered. The engine remained attached to the fuselage, and all three propeller blades showed postcrash impact damage with minimal leading edge and rotational signatures.

Post-Accident Examination

The cockpit remained intact, but the pilot's shoulder harness had separated. The fuel selector was found between the left and right tank detents. A placard warned that fuel flow occurs only when selectors are in the detents. Examination of the fuel selector revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The engine was test-run at the manufacturer's facility on April 8, 2014; it started on the first attempt and ran continuously at various power settings, including 5 minutes at full power. An engine monitor recorded cylinder head and exhaust gas temperatures, which began dropping at 1103:08; fuel quantity and flow were not recorded. A handheld GPS unit recorded a last data point at 1110:41 at 535 feet altitude, about 225 feet east of the main wreckage.

Medical and Toxicology

An autopsy determined the cause of death as blunt force trauma of the torso, with near-complete transection of the thoracic aorta. Toxicological tests detected dihydrocodeine, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, ibuprofen, and salicylate in urine but not in blood.

Additional Findings

The shoulder harness, manufactured in 1979 and repaired in 1999, had separated about 31 inches from the lapbelt fastener. The separation location corresponded to where the belt passes through a D-ring. Fraying measured 0.25 and 1.25 inches on edges, totaling 7.75 inches. The manufacturer's acceptable limit for fraying is 6 inches. Microscopic examination showed mushroom filament ends indicative of overload. The aircraft maintenance manual requires inspection of seat belts and shoulder harnesses during annual inspections. FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1B notes that fraying indicates wear and likely unairworthiness. In December 2013, the NTSB released Safety Alert SA-027 on restraint system maintenance.

Contributing factors

Causes

PilotIncorrect use/operation

Other contributing factors

Fasteners