History of Flight
On May 25, 2017, at 1153 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2 helicopter, registration N62UP, was destroyed when it impacted terrain near New Castle, Delaware. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The helicopter was registered to the University of Pennsylvania and operated by Metro Aviation, Inc., as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the accident site, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. The local flight originated from Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey, at 1117.
According to a representative of Metro Aviation, the purpose of the flight was for the pilot to practice instrument approaches at New Castle Airport (ILG), Wilmington, Delaware, pick up a clearance in flight, and return to ACY. The pilot obtained weather briefings via the Foreflight application at 1026 and 1042. At 1043, the pilot submitted a flight request form, which was approved by the company's operation control center five minutes later. The pilot performed the preflight inspection that morning.
Radar data and air traffic control (ATC) communications showed that after departing ACY, the flight proceeded uneventfully. At 1150, an ILG tower controller cleared the pilot for the ILS RWY 1 approach. The helicopter was established on the final approach course at 2,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The helicopter maintained 2,000 ft msl as it continued through the glideslope and crossed over the locator outer marker (HADIN). The published crossing altitude for HADIN was 1,842 ft.
The helicopter continued toward the runway; about 3 miles beyond HADIN and still at 2,000 ft msl, the pilot declared a missed approach. The controller advised the pilot to fly the published missed approach procedure. The helicopter climbed to 2,525 ft msl before turning right and descending to 2,225 ft msl. Radar contact was lost when the helicopter was at 1,625 ft msl. No further communications were received.
One witness reported seeing the helicopter "spinning down…out of the clouds in an upside-down nose dive." Another reported that the helicopter descended "like a rocket" without smoke or fire before impact.
Personnel Information
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rotorcraft-helicopter rating, a flight instructor certificate with helicopter and instrument helicopter ratings, and a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on October 20, 2016. He reported 4,200 hours of total flight experience, with 100 hours in the previous 6 months.
According to Metro Aviation's duty log, the pilot had accumulated 827.0 hours with the company since June 2013, including 21.9 hours in IMC and 33.2 hours of simulated instrument time. Since January 1, 2016, he completed 18 precision and 21 non-precision instrument approaches. He had flown to ILG for the company only once before, on March 12, 2017, on a day visual flight rules flight.
The pilot's most recent instrument proficiency program check flight was on April 9, 2017, during which he practiced several instrument approaches including an ILS approach and a missed approach.
Aircraft Information
The light helicopter was manufactured in 2006 and configured with the pilot's seat on the right side. It was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW206B2 engines, a four-blade rigid hingeless main rotor system, and a fenestron-type antitorque system. It also had an Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) with three-axis autopilot.
According to the helicopter flight manual, the AFCS could perform localizer and ILS approaches and had a "Go around (GA)" mode for missed approaches. The glideslope mode captured when deviation was within -0.2/+0.5 dot. In GA mode, the helicopter would acquire a vertical speed of 1000 ft/min or 75 knots indicated airspeed.
The most recent 100-hour inspection was on April 25, 2017, at an airframe total time of 5,152.1 hours. Before the accident flight, the airframe total time was 5,163.1 hours; left and right engine total operating times were 5,168.9 and 5,155.7 hours, respectively.
Meteorological Information
The 1036 weather observation from ILG reported wind from 070° at 13 knots, visibility 4 miles in light rain and mist, overcast clouds at 500 ft above ground level, temperature 14°C, dew point 14°C, and altimeter 29.52 inches of mercury.
The 1151 observation reported wind from 050° at 7 knots, visibility 2 1/2 miles in mist, overcast clouds at 500 ft, temperature 16°C, dew point 16°C, and altimeter 29.53 inches of mercury.
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Weather Tool images between ACY and ILG at 1000, 1030, 1100, 1130, and 1200 indicated IMC to "low" IMC prevailed.
The terminal forecast for ILG predicted overcast ceilings and light rain showers, with VFR conditions expected after 1400. The forecast for ACY also predicted IMC conditions. The area forecast for southern New Jersey and Delaware expected ceilings at 1,000 ft with visibility 3-5 miles in light rain and mist.
Inflight weather advisories included AIRMETs warning of IFR conditions, moderate turbulence, and low-level wind shear (LLWS), expected through 1700.
A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration HRRR model sounding for the accident location at 1200 predicted a wind profile with easterly winds below a frontal inversion and winds veering to the south/southwest above, with increasing speeds. The data indicated potential for moderate or greater turbulence and a greater than 90% probability of turbulence/wind shear at 1,600 ft.
Three aircraft reports confirmed frontal inversions and wind direction/speed changes with height. One airplane reported a saturated environment from 4,000 ft to the surface. All three reported low-level wind maximums near 3,000 ft from the south at 31-39 knots, and winds below 1,000 ft from the east. One report showed a sharp temperature increase at about 1,620 ft, suggesting possible turbulence.
Four PIREPs within 100 miles of the accident reported cloud bases as low as 400 ft and tops at 2,000 ft. One described the air as "smooth."
Wreckage and Impact Information
The helicopter came to rest in a ditch about 3,200 ft before the runway threshold and right of the centerline. It was fragmented and partially consumed by postimpact fire. All major components were in the main wreckage. A fence 15 ft from the wreckage had a post cut at a 45° angle, with a rotor blade embedded in it.
The cockpit and forward fuselage were partially consumed by fire. Control continuity was confirmed to the rotor head through several breaks. No preimpact anomalies were noted with the found sections. The standby attitude indicator had rotational scoring on the gyro housing.
The rotor head and transmission remained attached but separated from the airframe. All four main rotor blades were attached; three were consumed by fire. Pitch-change links were intact. The tailboom and fenestron were impact-separated; fenestron vanes were bent opposite rotation and showed rotational scoring.
Both engines were impact-separated. Left and right power turbine drive shafts exhibited torsional deformation and fractures; turbine wheels showed rotational scoring.
The engine control system units and data collection units were damaged, preventing data download. The warning unit (WU) retained chronological but untimestamped warnings. Data showed engine start-up warnings, then rotor rpm warnings cycling between normal range (95%-106%), above 106%, and above 112% with gong sounds. Subsequently, the autopilot warning illuminated, and rotor rpm warnings continued cycling.
According to the helicopter flight manual, the autopilot warning illuminated when the autopilot was disengaged or failed.
Medical and Pathological Information
The State of Delaware Division of Forensic Science performed an autopsy; the pilot died from multiple blunt force injuries. FAA toxicology testing was negative for ethanol and tested drugs.
Organizational Information
Metro Aviation's operations manual required all pilots to undergo initial and recurrent training, including 4 hours of instrument training annually. The company's instrument proficiency program required quarterly checks.
Approved sources for weather information included National Weather Service (NWS) products. Other company pilots often used NWS HEMS Weather Tool, terminal forecasts, ForeFlight, and Weathermeister.
Weather minimums for a straight-in Category I precision instrument approach for helicopters, with medium intensity approach lighting and runway alignment indicator lights, were 1/4 mile visibility or 1,600 ft runway visual range at 200 ft agl on the glideslope.
Additional Information
At 1128, the pilot contacted Philadelphia ATCT and reported the helicopter at 4,000 ft msl heading direct to Cedar Lake. The controller provided radar vectors for the ILS approach to runway 1.
At 1135, the pilot requested an IFR clearance back to ACY after the approach. At 1139, communications were transferred to the South Departure controller, who was made aware of the request.
The SD controller vectored the helicopter for the approach. At 1150, he cleared the pilot for the approach with a restriction to maintain at or above 2,000 ft until established. The helicopter intercepted the approach course at a 30° angle about 1 nautical mile outside the approach gate. The pilot was then transferred to the local (LC) controller at ILG.
At 1150, the pilot contacted the LC and reported crossing HADIN at 2,000 ft. The LC cleared the pilot to land runway 1.
At 1151, a position relief briefing (PRB) took place. At 1152, the pilot reported he would like to go around and start a missed approach. The on-coming LC asked if he had coordinated with PHL, and the pilot said no.
At 1153, the on-coming LC asked if the pilot had the airport in sight; the pilot responded that he received "some bad vectors at the very end" and wanted to come back around. The LC instructed the pilot to fly the missed approach and coordinated with PHL. There was no response from the pilot, and radar contact was lost at 1153:18.
The LC attempted to contact the pilot; at 1157, she stated to PHL that black smoke was visible and the pilot could not be reached.
According to FAA Order 7110.65W, for final approach course interception, controllers should assign headings to permit intercept at no more than a 20° angle if intercept occurs less than 2 miles from the approach gate, or 30° if 2 miles or more.