2 fatalities

15 Feb 2019: Cessna 421 C (N421NS) — Canadian, TX

Canadian, TX, United States

On 15 Feb 2019, a Cessna 421 C (registration N421NS) was involved in an aviation accident near Canadian, TX. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while in instrument meteorological conditions with icing conditions present, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin into terrain. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On February 15, 2019, a Cessna 421C (N421NS) was destroyed in a crash near Canadian, Texas. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The flight departed Amarillo and was operating under Part 91.

History of Flight

On February 15, 2019, about 1000 central standard time, a Cessna 421C airplane, registration N421NS, was destroyed when it impacted terrain near Canadian, Texas. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

Recorded flight track data showed that at 0900, the airplane climbed out from Tradewind Airport (TDW), Amarillo, Texas, and proceeded north-northeast toward Hemphill County Airport (HHF). The airplane passed through 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl), turned northeast, and continued to climb to a cruise altitude of about 7,500 ft msl. From 0918 to 0921, the airplane gradually descended until the track data was temporarily lost at 4,900 ft msl and 13 nm southwest of HHF.

The pilot was receiving visual flight rules (VFR) flight following services from Amarillo terminal radar approach control (AMA TRACON), who transferred him to Albuquerque Center (ZAB) Sector 15. Services were terminated at 0920 when the airplane was 18.7 miles southwest of HHF. The pilot did not request an instrument approach or solicit any other assistance from air traffic control.

At 0925, about 6 nm west of HHF, the flight track resumed, and the airplane was recorded at 4,100 ft msl and climbing to the north. The airplane continued north and climbed through 6,000 ft msl, then began a shallow left turn and climbed to 6,600 ft msl. The shallow left turn continued, but the airplane began a descent; the final recorded data ended at 0935, with the airplane about 20 nm northwest of HHF at 5,100 ft msl on a southwest heading. The final recorded data was about 13 nm northwest of the accident site.

A witness located about 5 miles northeast of HHF was monitoring the common traffic advisory frequency at HHF from about 0915 to 0930. He reported hearing the pilot and responding after recognizing his voice. The witness stated that the pilot asked about cloud height; the witness replied that clouds were 800 to 1,000 ft above ground level (agl). The witness had checked local automated weather reports about 0900, which indicated clouds 700 to 1,000 ft agl and visibility 6 to 10 miles. In his final radio call, the pilot responded, "Ok, see you in a little bit." The witness did not see the airplane in the air and reported being notified of a fire west of Canadian at 1006; he flew his helicopter to the fire and discovered the crashed airplane.

Personnel Information

A review of the pilot's available logbook entries from 2014 to 2016 revealed that the pilot completed several GPS instrument approaches and accumulated 23.8 hours of simulated instrument flight time and 18 hours of actual instrument flight time during that period. A logbook entry indicated the pilot completed a flight review in the accident airplane in January 2018. The only logbook entries after 2016 were the 2018 flight review.

Aircraft Information

The airplane was not equipped with anti-icing or de-icing equipment. An acquaintance who spoke with the pilot reported that the airplane's horizontal situation indicator and pressurization system were not working, but he did not know if they had been repaired nor give an exact timeframe for the non-working components. A review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that on January 21, 2019, an overhauled horizontal situation indicator was installed in the airplane, replacing an old unit that had malfunctioned. There was no record of any unresolved maintenance issues. Archived FAA documentation showed a Garmin GNS-530W GPS system and related components were installed in June 2008.

Meteorological Information

Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed across the region. Cloud bases were solid overcast; at HHF the ceiling was 800 ft agl, about 30 miles west at Mesa Vista Ranch Airport (TX13) the ceiling was about 900 ft agl, and about 33 miles southwest at Perry Lefors Field Airport (PPA) the ceiling was 400 ft agl. At each station the ceiling rapidly deteriorated over the previous 1 to 2 hours. Conditions at HHF had been clear about 2 hours before the accident and VFR about 1 hour before.

A cold front advanced from the northeast, producing wind shear in the lowest 3,000 ft agl. Wind between the surface and about 3,800 ft msl was from the northeast at 6 to 8 knots. At 4,300 ft msl, the wind was from west-southwest at 8 knots, increasing to a west wind of about 40 knots at 5,700 ft msl. There was potential for severe or greater turbulence between about 3,700 ft and 5,700 ft msl. Clouds were estimated between about 3,100 ft and 4,500 ft msl. There was likely some icing in the clouds, with potential for light icing below 4,300 ft msl. The atmosphere was below freezing below about 4,350 ft msl, and a steep temperature inversion was noted between about 3,750 ft and 5,700 ft msl.

AIRMET advisories for IFR conditions, moderate turbulence below flight level 180, and moderate icing between the freezing level and FL230 were active for the accident site at the accident time. The investigation did not find any record that the pilot received a weather briefing that day. The pilot was receiving VFR flight following services from air traffic control during a time when IMC was known and reported.

The witness who responded in his helicopter reported that when he arrived, clouds were overcast at 500 ft agl, visibility 10 miles, temperature 27°F, and light wind from the north.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The airplane impacted remote terrain, and a post-impact fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. A postaccident examination indicated the airplane impacted the ground in a slight nose-low and wings-level attitude with no evidence of forward momentum. All major components were observed at the site; the empennage was displaced to the right. The flap setting was 15° extended. The cockpit and instrumentation were destroyed by fire and could not be examined. The engines were found embedded in mud, and all propeller blades were accounted for. Engines and propellers exhibited signatures consistent with rotation at impact. The examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy performed on the pilot at South Plains Forensic Pathology, Lubbock, Texas, listed the cause of death as blunt force injuries. Toxicology testing at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory identified tadalafil, a prescription medication used to treat erectile dysfunction and benign prostatic hyperplasia. The FAA recommends not flying for 36 hours after use. Also identified was a small amount of ethanol in muscle but not in brain, consistent with postmortem production. Another alcohol, n-propanol, which is also produced postmortem, was identified. The tested samples sustained putrefaction.

Air Traffic Control

The airplane departed TDW in VMC and was provided VFR flight following services to HHF by an AMA controller. The flight appeared routine to the Albuquerque center (ZAB) air traffic manager (ATM), who described the traffic as light in volume and complexity. The ZAB controller was not aware of any adverse weather conditions along the route. HHF does not have weather reporting capability, but the controller had access to weather via a request function. The ZAB ATM stated that there is no facility expectation for controllers to obtain weather or ensure a pilot has weather for their destination when receiving VFR flight following. Radar services were terminated when the airplane descended through 5,900 ft about 18 miles from HHF, which is normal practice due to insufficient radio and radar coverage below 7,000 ft.

Contributing factors

Airspeed — Not attained/maintainedAngle of attack — Not attained/maintainedPilotContributed to outcomeEffect on operationEffect on equipment