No fatalities

26 Jun 2022: PIPER PA-24-250 NO SERIES (N14FC) — COCHRAN FRED W JR — Warm Springs, GA

Warm Springs, GA, United States

On 26 Jun 2022, a PIPER PA-24-250 NO SERIES (registration N14FC) operated by COCHRAN FRED W JR was involved in an aviation accident near Warm Springs, GA. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The loss of engine power due to fuel starvation as the result of the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection of the fuel supply before flight and the mismanagement of fuel during flight. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On June 26, 2022, a Piper PA-24-250 (N14FC) experienced an engine power reduction and subsequent total loss during descent, resulting in a forced landing near Warm Springs, Georgia. The pilot and passenger sustained serious injuries; the aircraft was substantially damaged.

Accident Details

On June 26, 2022, about 1410 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-24-250 airplane, registration N14FC, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Warm Springs, Georgia. The private pilot and passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated by the pilot as a personal flight under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

Flight and Engine Failure

The instrument flight rules flight departed from St. Pete-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), Clearwater, Florida, at 1153, en route to Newnan Coweta County Airport (CCO), Newnan, Georgia. After about 2 hours and 15 minutes, 20 miles south of the destination, the pilot completed an en route descent from 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 5,000 ft msl. Upon reaching 5,000 ft msl, the engine power was set to 2300 rpm; however, it abruptly decreased to 1500 rpm. The pilot reported that the engine did not sputter, but rather just “rolled back.” He moved the mixture to rich, ensured the fuel selectors were selected to the main tanks, and turned on the electric fuel pump; however, power did not increase. He declared an emergency with air traffic control, and they advised him of Roosevelt Memorial Airport (5A9), Warm Springs, Georgia, behind his flight path.

The pilot completed a left 180° turn and saw the runway at 5A9 about 6-7 miles ahead. As he maneuvered toward the runway, the engine lost all power. Realizing he did not have the glide performance to reach the runway, he turned toward a small logging road. The airplane impacted terrain and trees during the approach to the small road, about 1.5 miles north of the runway.

Post-Accident Examination

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the airplane at the accident site and supervised its recovery. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. When the airplane’s electrical power was turned on, the left and right main fuel tank gauges displayed a reading of about 1/4 full, and the left tip tank gauge measured just below 1/4 full. The electric fuel pump could be heard running. Both fuel selectors were found selected to the main positions.

The inspector observed that the main wing fuel tanks contained no trace of fuel, no breaches of the fuel bladders were observed, and when the wings were removed for recovery, no fuel exited either main fuel tank. The left tip tank remained connected to the wing, was not breached, and contained about 3 gallons of fuel. The right tip tank separated from the wing, was partially breached, and no fuel was present in the tank.

Further examination of the engine at the recovery facility found crankshaft and camshaft continuity and thumb compression on all cylinders. Both magnetos produced spark, and the spark plugs exhibited normal combustion signatures. No anomalies were observed with the engine-driven fuel pump, and it contained no residual fuel. During low pressure air tests of the fuel lines, with the fuel selector positioned to the main wing tanks, no fuel was observed to exit the lines, and no blockages were present. There was no evidence of oil or fuel leakage on the airframe.

Fuel System Information

According to the pilot, throughout the accident flight he switched from using the left and right main tanks and did not use the tip tanks at any point. When he initiated the descent preceding the loss of engine power, he recalled moving both left and right fuel selectors to the main tank on positions. The pilot reported using the electric fuel pump during the loss of engine power; however, carburetor heat was not used during the accident flight.

The pilot recalled that the fuel level on both main tanks were near his finger length from full when visually checked during the preflight, but the main tanks were not topped-off. He reported utilizing the airplane’s onboard fuel calculator to monitor fuel flow; however, it was not his practice to use the device to determine total fuel onboard. He recalled after the accident that 59 gallons of fuel was onboard at takeoff, and that the fuel flow throughout the accident flight was 13 gallons per hour en route. According to basic fuel calculation estimates, the accident flight would have burned about 31 gallons.

According to the airplane’s owner handbook and the tip tanks supplemental type certificate (STC), the airplane was equipped with two main fuel tanks per each wing totaling 60 gallons (30 per main tank) and two tip tanks totaling 30 gallons (15 per tip tank). Photographs of the two fuel selector switches revealed that the engine could be operated from one or both main tanks, and either tip tank. The STC flight manual supplement warned that the fuel selector should not be selected to any tank that is empty, and that the switch should be placed to a tank with fuel remaining or turned off. The tip tank fuel was only to be used during level flight.

Review of the FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-09-35 Carburetor Icing Probability Chart found that the airplane was at risk of serious icing at glide power while descending from 8,000 ft msl to 5,000 ft msl.

Contributing factors

PilotFluid level