Accident Overview
On May 25, 2023, at about 1209 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-25-260, registration N454AB, operated by Aerial Banners North Inc., was substantially damaged when it impacted the ground near Hollywood, Florida. The commercial pilot was seriously injured. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a banner tow operation.
Flight Sequence
According to the operator's director of ground operations, who supervised the flight from the banner pickup point and communicated with the pilot via handheld radio, the pilot departed from runway 10L at North Perry Airport (HWO) around 1155 for a scheduled 1200 banner tow. The pilot completed the first pass for hook deployment and verification, then missed the banner on three consecutive pickup attempts. The director noted that the pilot made crosswind turns earlier than expected—over taxiway Delta—but airspeed and altitude appeared normal.
After a change in the banner to be towed, the director relayed the new lane assignment to the pilot. The pilot made another approach but missed the pickup. During the climb out, the banner tow hook struck the right cone of the lane. The director stepped to fix the cone and then observed the airplane at about 100 ft above ground level in a spin before it impacted the ground.
Witness Statements
A witness with banner towing experience observed the accident from about 1,000 ft away while a passenger in a car. She saw the airplane approach with the hook extended, but the hook did not catch the banner rope. The airplane pitched up, climbed to about 50 ft, then made a steep banked climbing left turn. It rolled wings level onto a westerly heading at about 200 ft. Moments later, the left wing dropped, the nose pitched down, and the airplane entered a left spin, rotating 180 degrees before impacting the ground in an almost horizontal, 20-degree nose-down attitude.
Pilot Interview
In an interview about four months after the accident, the pilot described a series of events similar to those reported by the director. After missing the banner pickup, during the climb he applied a usual amount of rudder but felt it “snap” or “let go,” causing an immediate left turn. He had little time to react and pushed the nose down. He recalled making a radio statement about the rudder but could not recall details.
Recorded Flight Data
Preliminary Automatic Dependent Surveillance Beacon data from the Federal Aviation Administration depicted a series of events consistent with witness descriptions. The data also showed that the pilot had flown progressively tighter patterns on each attempted banner pickup before the accident.
Pilot and Aircraft Information
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on January 10, 2023, at which time he reported about 821 total flight hours. He was hired by the operator on November 14, 2022, and had completed 60 hours of training, along with written and practical examinations.
The airplane was manufactured in 1974 and powered by a Lycoming O-540-G1A5, 260-horsepower engine. Its most recent annual inspection was completed on March 6, 2023, at 9,573.1 total hours.
Postaccident Examination
Examination of the cockpit revealed both magneto switches in the “ON” position, the electric fuel boost pump “ON,” the throttle full forward, mixture full rich, and carburetor heat “OFF.” The vertical speed indicator indicated a descent of about 300 ft per minute.
The tow hook, constructed of ¼-inch-thick steel rebar bent into three roughly “J” shapes bound together, was recovered. One of the three prongs was bent outward and nearly straight.
The propeller had separated from the engine; fracture surfaces were consistent with torsional overload. One blade showed S-bending, leading-edge gouging, and chordwise scratching; the other had curling and about 4 inches of tip separation.
Engine examination found oil in rocker boxes, galleries, and sump. Powertrain continuity was established from the propeller flange to rear gears. Both magnetos were functional. Thumb compression and suction were attained on all cylinders. Carburetor jets were clear, floats devoid of fuel, and float valve assembly functional. The carburetor bowl contained trace fuel; tests showed no water or contamination. The fuel strainer was full of fuel with some debris outside the screen, but no water contamination. Screens for the electric boost pump, fuel strainer, and carburetor were clean.
Examination of flight controls: Pitch control continuity was established from the control stick to the elevator through breaks in the system. Roll control continuity was established from the stick to the ailerons. Yaw control continuity was established from the rudder pedals to the left rudder control horn, but not to the right rudder control horn. The right rudder control horn was fractured, with corrosion on the fracture face.
The rudder arm assembly, including two extensions installed per a supplemental type certificate, was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory. The right side of the rudder horn had fractured about 1.25 inches from the vertical arm assembly body. The cast link had fractured in two locations. All fracture surfaces exhibited sufficient surface oxidation (rust) to conceal underlying metal. Yellow paint had begun to spall. After cleaning, the fracture surfaces exhibited dimpled rupture, consistent with overstress fracture of ductile material in tension and localized bending. Larger filament fracture surfaces showed features consistent with tensile and bending overstress. The composition was consistent with carbon steel; hardness unremarkable. The fractured link casting adjacent to the rudder arm assembly also exhibited overstress fracture features.
Operational Manual
The operator reported that its training manual described inadvertent recoil of the tow rope and contact with the airplane as a risk of banner tow operations. The manual stated that if a pilot suspected the tow hook had recoiled into the airplane and interfered with flight controls, only necessary control surface movement should be used to maintain attitude and altitude.