History of Flight
On February 1, 2024, about 1907 eastern standard time, a Beech V35B airplane, N6659L, was destroyed when it impacted two residences and the ground near Clearwater, Florida. The commercial pilot and two occupants of one residence were fatally injured, and one occupant of the other residence sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to FAA ADS-B data and air traffic control audio information, the flight departed about 1809 from Vero Beach Municipal Airport (VRB), Vero Beach, Florida, on an IFR flight plan destined for Clearwater Air Park (CLW), Clearwater, Florida. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at CLW and in the vicinity of the accident site.
While en route, the pilot established contact with several FAA air traffic control facilities. At 1856:26, while at 3,800 ft pressure altitude, the pilot was in contact with the West Arrival/Departure combined with Satellite sector of the Tampa Air Traffic Control Tower (TPA ATCT West Arrival/Departure). The controller instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 2,600 ft mean sea level (msl), which the pilot acknowledged. At 1857:32, the pilot requested a left turn to align with runway 34 at CLW, which the controller approved.
At 1859:21, about 5 nm east-southeast of CLW at 1,400 ft pressure altitude, the controller advised the pilot that CLW was about the pilot’s 2 o’clock position and 5 miles. The pilot said he was looking for the airport and needed to switch to the CLW CTAF to activate the pilot-controlled runway lights. The controller advised no traffic between the flight’s position and CLW. The pilot then cancelled the IFR clearance, and the controller terminated radar services, instructed the pilot to squawk VFR, and approved the frequency change. The flight continued southwest until about 1900, then turned right and proceeded west-northwest.
About 1902, when less than 2 nm southeast of CLW, it turned right and proceeded northwest, generally toward CLW but west of the runway 34 extended centerline. Between about 1903 and 1903:30, the flight continued northwest, flying about 0.5 nm west of CLW and nearly parallel to runway 34, then continuing past the airport. Beginning about 1903:46, the flight turned left (to the west, away from CLW), completed a 180° turn, proceeded generally south (flying about 2 nm west of CLW), then continued south past the airport.
Two individuals at the FBO at CLW reported hearing the accident pilot ask to turn on the runway lights. One individual informed the pilot that the lights were on (medium intensity from a previous pilot) but the pilot called back and asked again. The individual then keyed the microphone seven times to turn the lights to high intensity and again informed the pilot the lights were on. About 25 seconds later, the accident pilot again requested the lights be turned on and advised, “I have a fire.” The pilot did not respond to a request to repeat. One individual at CLW who saw the airplane reported no external fire visible.
According to ADS-B data, about 1905:15, when about 1.7 nm southwest from the center of CLW at about 900 ft pressure altitude, a 7777 transponder code displayed, followed by a change to 7700. The flight continued southeast, turned left to the east, then turned right onto an east-southeast heading. At 1905:49, at 1,200 ft pressure altitude, the pilot reestablished contact with TPA ATCT West Arrival/Departure, stating “nine five lima,” then “coming to Albert Whitted, I can’t see the other airport.” Albert Whitted Airport (SPG) was in St. Petersburg, Florida.
The controller advised the pilot that the flight was 1 mile south of CLW and asked if he could turn to heading 180° and maintain present altitude. At 1906:15, at 1,500 ft pressure altitude, the pilot made his last transmission, advising, “I’m losing engine.” The controller asked if he could see St Pete-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), which was 3 miles ahead, and advised that runways 18/36 were available. After the pilot’s last communication, the flight turned right and headed northeast, remaining about 1,500 ft pressure altitude until about 1906:41, then began descending. The last ADS-B target was at 1906:55 at 400 ft pressure altitude; the accident site was about 800 ft northeast.
Data from the airplane’s Appareo Stratus showed that between 1906:37 and 1906:58, descent rate increased from 297 fpm to a maximum of 5,836 fpm with a groundspeed increase from 79 to 120 kts. The accident site was about 224 ft from the last data point.
At 1906:59, a pilot of another airplane advised the controller that the accident airplane had gone down “really hard and is in flames.” That pilot reported that the descent angle was between 30° and 40° in a steep nose-down attitude, described as “like an uncontrolled descent,” and that he saw a “very bright light” descending very fast to impact.
Another witness, a passenger in a car driving south on US Highway 19 about 1/4 mile south of Gulf to Bay Boulevard, reported seeing a “fireball” or something on fire flying from west to east. She described it as a round fireball at the front of a white cone-shaped object, with no sound heard at the time.
The airplane crashed in a densely populated residential community, striking two residences and one vehicle. Two other residences were damaged by the postcrash fire. An individual in the first impacted residence sustained a minor injury when struck in the right leg by a piece of the airplane. Two individuals in the second impacted residence sustained fatal injuries.
The remains of the heat-damaged and impact-fragmented wreckage were found primarily in the second impacted residence and were secured for examination.
Personnel Information
Review of two provided pilot logbooks revealed the pilot’s first and last logged flights were March 14, 1994, and December 5, 2022, respectively. His total time and pilot-in-command time (as of the last logbook entry) were about 1,079 hours and 960 hours, respectively. The last logbook reflected that he passed a commercial check ride on March 16, 2022.
An Aircraft Insurance Renewal application dated January 23, 2024, showed the pilot reported a total flight time of 1,218 hours. His logbooks reflected no flights into or from CLW. An FBO employee who had worked at CLW for just under 1 year stated that the pilot called the day before the accident flight to provide credit card information; the employee noted that the pilot had never been to CLW before and that pilots have mentioned the airport is hard to find.
Aircraft Information
The engine’s maximum continuous horsepower and rpm were 285 at 2,700 rpm. The fuel supply system forward of the firewall consisted of flexible hoses from the firewall to the engine-driven fuel pump, to the metering valve, to the fuel manifold valve, and injector lines to each cylinder. A factory rebuilt engine was installed on June 27, 2016, with normal maintenance and inspections since; no specific entry existed for the flexible fuel hose from the metering valve outlet to the manifold valve inlet. The airplane had accrued about 583 hours between engine installation and the last annual inspection on November 13, 2023.
The Pilot’s Operating Handbook included an “Engine Fire In Flight” checklist specifying to pull the firewall air control and turn off the fuel selector valve in preparation for a forced landing, and for an emergency descent, to place throttle idle, propeller high rpm, landing gear down, and establish 154 kts.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Examination revealed evidence consistent with initial impact on a residence roof. A portion of the right-wing fuel tip tank was found on the roof; fragments and a navigation/strobe light were inside the residence. The roof tear was oriented on a magnetic heading of 075°. The main wreckage (cockpit, cabin, wings, engine assembly) came to rest upright on a magnetic heading of 164° within a second residence destroyed by impact and postcrash fire. Pieces were also in the street; the tailcone was about 84 ft east of the main wreckage and showed no soot.
The cockpit, cabin, both wings, and empennage were nearly destroyed by the postcrash fire. The fuel selector valve was found loose, positioned between left and right fuel tank inlet ports. The engine showed only a portion of the crankcase, top portions of cylinders 3 and 5, one propeller blade, one magneto, and ignition leads visible. A burned plywood section was found above or near cylinders 2, 4, 6, with unburned areas underneath. The top cowling was destroyed; nose and side panels had impact and fire damage. The propeller separated from the engine; the crankshaft flange was fractured.
Flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw showed no preimpact failure or malfunction. Both flap drive cables were found, but actuators were not identified. The pitch trim tab actuator housing assembly, bellcrank, and pulleys in the tail were consumed by fire; no failure of intact parts was found.
The cockpit was extensively damaged. The throttle control was 0.7 inch from full in, mixture full rich, propeller control 0.4 inch from full in. Avionics and instruments sustained heavy damage.
Engine oil sump examination showed the forward portion relatively soot-free, left side above throttle body mounting had dark soot, right side similarly soot, and bottom and sides showed white discoloration. Dirt inside the sump was consistent with impact. The forward sump gasket normal; from midpoint aft, extensive heat damage. Drivetrain, air induction, ignition, exhaust, and lubrication systems showed no preimpact failure or malfunction.
The throttle body and metering valve were impact separated and heat damaged; throttle and mixture cables remained attached. The throttle was wide open, mixture 1/8 inch from full rich stop. Fuel supply hoses were continuous from firewall to engine-driven fuel pump, to metering valve, to manifold valve. Impact fractures were noted on inlet and outlet fittings at the fuel metering valve and inlet of the engine-driven fuel pump. All but one b-nut were tight; the b-nut at the outlet of the fuel metering valve was 1.25 flats from being finger tight.
An NTSB Materials Laboratory examination of the metered fuel hose and fractured outlet fitting revealed thermal damage on about the last 3 inches of fire sleeve. The fracture surface showed deformation and slant fractures consistent with bending overstress. Threads on the hose b-nut and fitting showed no cross threading or anomaly. After assembly, the connection appeared solid and fully seated at minimum torque.
Medical and Pathological Information
A postmortem examination of the pilot by the District Six Medical Examiner’s Office determined the cause of death as blunt trauma, manner of death accident. Toxicology testing by the FAA’s Forensic Services Laboratory on various specimens found no evidence of impairing drugs, negative for carboxyhemoglobin (reporting cutoff 10%), and glucose level in vitreous not considered abnormal.
Tests and Research
An NTSB Sound Spectrum study of recorded audio when the pilot keyed the microphone near the end of the flight at 1847:55, 1905:51, and 1906:15 revealed engine rpm about 2,450 for the first two and about 2,500 rpm at 1906:15, about 43 seconds before impact.
Multiple videos from businesses west of the accident site depicted a light descending steeply with engine sounds, followed by a fireball. NTSB sound analysis determined that during the last 5 seconds before ground contact, engine rpm was calculated to be 2,053.
One impacted vehicle displayed two parallel slash marks on trunk and left rear panel, 2.125 ft apart. The angle between the roof edge adjacent to the main impact crater and the ground was 22.7°. Using a propeller slash formula with the distance between slashes and groundspeed of 120 kts, engine rpm calculated as about 1,907. Using the descent angle of 22.7°, same number of blades, and rpm of 1,907, calculated airspeed was about 130 kts.