What happened
On April 14, 2015, at 20:05 JST, an Asiana Airlines, Inc. Airbus A320-200, registered HL7762, was performing a scheduled approach to runway 28 at Hiroshima Airport. During the final stages of the approach, the aircraft's descent path became lower than the prescribed approach path.
As the aircraft descended, the crew noted difficulty maintaining visual contact with the runway due to cloud cover. Despite the loss of visual references, the pilot-in-command elected to continue the approach. The aircraft subsequently struck the Aeronautical Radio Navigation Aids located in front of the runway 28 threshold. Following the collision, the aircraft touched down in front of the runway threshold and continued forward along the runway before deviating to the south side of the runway strip, where it eventually came to a stop.
The flight was carrying 81 people, including 73 passengers and 8 crew members. The impact resulted in 28 people (26 passengers and 2 crew) sustaining slight injuries. While the aircraft suffered substantial damage, no fire occurred during the incident.
The investigation
The Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) examined the flight data, cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcripts, and meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. The investigation focused on the decision-making process regarding the approach height threshold (Decision Altitude) and the crew's failure to execute a go-around when visual references were lost. The investigation also reviewed the company's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and the effectiveness of Crew Resource Management (CRM) during the approach.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was that the aircraft undershot the runway and struck navigation aids during a failed attempt to execute a go-around.
- The pilot-in-command continued the approach below the Decision Altitude (DA) without maintaining the required visual references to the runway.
- The first officer, acting as the pilot-monitoring, failed to call for an immediate go-around when the runway became invisible at the DA.
- There were indications of insufficient company training regarding compliance with regulations and SOPs.
- Crew Resource Management (CRM) failed to function effectively, as the monitoring pilot did not assert the need for a missed approach.