What happened
On 15 July 2003, an Airbus A310-308, registration C-FDAT, arrived at Manchester Airport from Toronto. As the aircraft was taxiing into Stand 6, the upper surface of its left engine cowling struck the underside of an incorrectly positioned airbridge. The impact caused considerable damage to the engine cowling, spanning approximately 1.5 metres. The aircraft stopped 2.8 metres short of its intended parking position.
Prior to the arrival of the aircraft, a technical fault had prevented the airbridge at Stand 6 from being retracted into its correct parking position, leaving it displaced by 4.1 metres. Although the airbridge driver attempted to report the fault, they were unable to reach Terminal Control via telephone and instead sought out a supervisor. During this time, the aircraft approached the stand following the illuminated Stand Entry Docking Guidance (SEDG) lights.
An Airfield Safety Officer (ASO) was assigned to marshal the aircraft. However, due to intervening duties involving passengers at a different stand, the ASO arrived at Stand 6 just as the aircraft was turning into the parking area. The aircraft commander, following standard procedures, used the illuminated SEDG lights for guidance, unaware that the airbridge presented an obstruction.
The investigation
The AAIB investigation established that the SEDG lights had been activated by Apron Control, which is routine practice regardless of whether an aircraft is permitted to self-park or requires a marshaller. The investigation found that the airbridge driver had not notified Apron Control of the obstruction. Furthermore, the communication methods available to ground staff were found to be insufficiently robust, as the driver relied on a telephone that was engaged.
Investigators also noted that the ASO was under time pressure due to other airfield duties, which prevented a thorough check of the stand for obstructions before the aircraft arrived. Crucially, there was no facility at the stand for ground staff to activate a 'STOP' signal or control the SEDG lights locally to warn approaching aircraft of the misplaced airbridge.
Findings
- The routine activation of SEDG lights by Apron Control, even when a marshaller is required, acted as a latent causal factor.
- The airbridge driver failed to report the incorrectly parked airbridge to Apron Control.
- Communication protocols were inadequate, as the airbridge driver could not immediately alert Apron Control to the obstruction.
- The marshaller did not sufficiently inspect the stand for obstructions due to time pressures from other tasks.
- There was a lack of local controls at the stand to activate a 'STOP' signal for approaching aircraft.