FlightFinder
No fatalities

2015-03-29: Airbus A320 (C-FTJP) — Air Canada — Halifax-Stanfield, Canada

Halifax-Stanfield, CanadaLanding (descent or approach)

On March 29, 2015, an Airbus A320 (registration C-FTJP) operated by Air Canada was involved in an aviation accident near Halifax-Stanfield, Canada during landing or approach. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: 1. Air Canada’s standard operating procedure (SOP) and practice when flying in flight path angle guidance mode was that, once the aircraft was past the final approach fix, the flight crews were not required to monitor the aircraft’s altitude and distance from… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 16 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781193090Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered C-FTJP
Aircraft registered C-FTJP. Photo: airforcefe from Richmond / CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On 29 March 2015, Air Canada flight 624 (Airbus A320-211) struck power lines and terrain short of Runway 05 at Halifax during a non-precision approach. The aircraft was destroyed; 25 people sustained injuries. The investigation identified multiple causes and contributing factors.

Accident Description

On 29 March 2015, an Air Canada Airbus A320-211 (registration C-FTJP, serial number 233) operating as flight 624 from Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario, to Halifax/Stanfield International Airport, Nova Scotia, was on a scheduled flight with 133 passengers and 5 crew members. At approximately 0030 Atlantic Daylight Time, during a non-precision approach to Runway 05, the aircraft severed power lines, then struck the snow-covered ground about 740 feet before the runway threshold. The aircraft continued airborne through the localizer antenna array, struck the ground twice more, and slid along the runway before coming to rest on the left side of the runway approximately 1900 feet beyond the threshold. The aircraft was evacuated; 25 people were taken to local hospitals with injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. There was no post-impact fire. The emergency locator transmitter was not activated. The accident occurred during hours of darkness.

Causes and Contributing Factors

The official investigation identified the following causes and contributing factors: 1. Air Canada’s standard operating procedure (SOP) and practice when flying in flight path angle guidance mode did not require flight crews to monitor aircraft altitude and distance from the threshold once past the final approach fix, contrary to flight crew operating manuals. 2. Following Air Canada’s practice, the flight crew did not monitor altitude and distance from the threshold after selecting the flight path angle. 3. The flight crew did not notice the aircraft had drifted below and diverged from the planned vertical descent profile, nor that it had crossed the minimum descent altitude further back from the threshold. 4. Given challenging conditions for acquiring and maintaining visual cues, the flight crew likely delayed disconnecting the autopilot beyond the minimum descent altitude due to reliance on the autopilot system. 5. Approach and runway lights were not changed from setting 4 to setting 5, so they were not at maximum brightness during the approach. 6. The system controlling airfield lighting preset selections for brightness setting 4 did not comply with NAV CANADA’s requirement for the omnidirectional approach lighting system to be at its brightest settings. 7. Limited visual cues, short availability, potential visual illusions, and reduced lighting brightness diminished the flight crew’s ability to detect that the approach path was taking the aircraft short of the runway. 8. The flight crew’s recognition of being too low was delayed due to plan continuation bias. 9. The aircraft struck terrain approximately 740 feet short of the runway threshold, bounced twice, then slid along the runway before stopping approximately 1900 feet beyond the threshold. 10. During the impact sequence, the captain’s head struck the glare shield because insufficient acceleration forces prevented the shoulder harness from locking. 11. The first officer sustained head and right eye injuries from striking the glare shield because the automatic locking feature of the right-side shoulder-harness inertia reel was unserviceable. 12. A flight attendant was injured by a coffee brewer that came free of its mounting base because its locking system was not correctly engaged. 13. Because no emergency was expected, passengers and cabin crew were not in a brace position at initial impact. 14. Most passenger injuries were consistent with not adopting a brace position.

Other Findings

The investigation reported: 1. The service director assessed the evacuation flow as good and determined no need to open the R1 door. 2. Flight attendants in the rear noted no life-threatening hazards; no evacuation order had been given, and deplaned passengers and firefighters were observed near the rear where slide deployment could create hazards, so they did not open the L2 and R2 doors. 3. Transport Canada required dual-exit drill training but did not require all cabin crew to receive it before an organization implemented the 1: (Note: The source sentence was incomplete; the article reflects the stated excerpt.)

Risk Findings

The investigation identified 12 risk findings, including issues with cockpit voice recorder power supply, Transport Canada’s aeromedical surveillance, child-restraint regulations, passenger dress for evacuation, approach lighting system visibility considerations, cargo compartment beam design, maintenance instructions, passenger address system emergency power, passenger baggage retrieval during evacuation, pre-departure briefing effectiveness, emergency response plan transportation resources, and practice for transporting persons from accident sites.

Probable cause

1. Air Canada’s standard operating procedure (SOP) and practice when flying in flight path angle guidance mode was that, once the aircraft was past the final approach fix, the flight crews were not required to monitor the aircraft’s altitude and distance from the threshold or to make any adjustments to the flight path angle. This practice was not in accordance with the flight crew operating manuals of Air Canada or Airbus. 2. As per Air Canada’s practice, once the flight path angle was selected and the aircraft began to descend, the flight crew did not monitor the altitude and distance from the threshold, nor did they make any adjustments to the flight path angle. 3. The flight crew did not notice that the aircraft had drifted below and diverged from the planned vertical descent angle flight profile, nor were they aware that the aircraft had crossed the minimum descent altitude further back from the threshold. 4. Considering the challenging conditions to acquire and maintain the visual cues, it is likely the flight crew delayed disconnecting the autopilot until beyond the minimum descent altitude because of their reliance on the autopilot system. 5. The approach and runway lights were not changed from setting 4 to setting 5; therefore, these lights were not at their maximum brightness setting during the approach. 6. The system to control the airfield lighting’s preset selections for brightness setting 4 was not in accordance with the NAV CANADA Air Traffic Control Manual of Operations requirement for the omnidirectional approach lighting system to be at its brightest settings. 7. The limited number of visual cues and the short time that they were available to the flight crew, combined with potential visual illusions and the reduced brightness of the approach and runway lights, diminished the flight crew’s ability to detect that the aircraft’s approach path was taking it short of the runway. 8. The flight crew’s recognition that the aircraft was too low during the approach would have been delayed because of plan continuation bias. 9. The aircraft struck terrain approximately 740 feet short of the runway threshold, bounced twice, and then slid along the runway before coming to a rest approximately 1900 feet beyond the runway threshold. 10. At some time during the impact sequence, the captain’s head struck the glare shield because there were insufficient acceleration forces to lock the shoulder harness and prevent movement of his upper body. 11. The first officer sustained a head injury and serious injury to the right eye as a result of striking the glare shield because the automatic locking feature of the right-side shoulder-harness inertia reel was unserviceable. 12. A flight attendant was injured by a coffee brewer that came free of its mounting base because its locking system was not correctly engaged. 13. Because no emergency was expected, the passengers and cabin crew were not in a brace position at the time of the initial impact. 14. Most of the injuries sustained by the passengers were consistent with not adopting a brace position.

Related events

Same aircraft family

Same operator

More Airbus A320 safety records →

More accident analyses