Approach Management
During the arrival, after passing the DUDOK waypoint, the aircraft was high on profile due to an insufficient descent rate. The flight crew maintained a selected speed of 250 knots before turning onto final, placing the aircraft in a high-energy state and delaying configuration changes. This required an irregular glideslope intercept from above. At that time, the flight crew's focus was primarily on configuring the aircraft, reducing speed, and capturing the glideslope. They elected to descend manually using flight directors, increasing workload as they approached 1,800 feet.
Prior to reaching 1,800 feet, the missed approach altitude of 3,000 feet was selected in the flight control unit (FCU) altitude window. The altitude selector was pulled, initiating a mode change to open climb. This increased thrust, as the auto-thrust system remained active. The crew did not notice this change despite the annunciation, causing airspeed to increase. Without this automated thrust increase, the crew may have been able to stabilize the approach according to the operator's criteria. The undetected thrust further destabilized the approach and led to the initial flap overspeed. Had the crew identified the flight mode annunciator (FMA) change, timely action might have prevented the flap overspeed and prompted an earlier go-around.
The Go-Around
Assessing that the aircraft was unlikely to meet stable approach criteria, the captain initiated a go-around. A go-around requires a methodical sequence of actions by both pilot flying and pilot monitoring. During the go-around, the aircraft transitions quickly from descending at low thrust to climbing at high thrust with changing configuration. The tempo is rapid compared to other normal maneuvers.
At initiation, the flight crew did not conduct the sequence according to standard operating procedures, leading to delayed, omitted, and out-of-sequence actions. In a two-engine, high-energy go-around, the aircraft accelerates rapidly. When the first officer (FO) did not increase pitch to the expected nose-up attitude, the aircraft accelerated faster than expected. This limited time to retract flaps and landing gear before exceeding operational limitations.
The captain, as pilot monitoring, had the opportunity to observe the rapid acceleration and the FO's non-standard pitch and flap selections. These were cues to formally intervene and reduce the risk of flap and landing gear overspeed.
Cockpit Gradient
The captain reported high regard for the FO's experience, which influenced his performance expectations. Consideration of the FO's background also affected the point at which the captain felt intervention was necessary. In hindsight, the captain believed the cockpit gradient contributed to the occurrence by delaying required intervention.