What happened
An incident involving two aircraft occurred when the flight crew of VH-VQG and the pilot of VH-UJS operated on reciprocal runway trajectories. The pilot of VH-UJS commenced takeoff without confirming the position or intentions of the inbound VH-VQG. This lack of coordination was compounded by a failure to establish direct communication, as the pilots did not hear several significant radio broadcasts regarding each other's locations. The pilot of VH-UJS likely had the radio turned off during the initial inbound broadcasts from VH-VQG, missing the opportunity to learn that the latter intended to land on runway 18. Furthermore, a very short 97-second window between taxi and takeoff broadcasts for VH-UJS limited the time available to identify the approaching aircraft.
The investigation
The investigation focused on the breakdown in radio communications and the accuracy of weather information. It was determined that the flight crew of VH-VQG did not hear the rolling broadcast from VH-UJS because it coincided with contact from Brisbane Centre on the frequency. Additionally, the investigation examined the wind information used for flight planning. While the crew of VH-VQG recorded a wind direction of 230° (Magnetic), the actual local wind was reported as 329° (Magnetic). It remains unclear if the crew misheard the weather recording or if the recording itself was inaccurate, as the audio could not be retrieved.
Findings
- The flight crew of VH-VQG planned an approach for the least favorable runway due to incorrect wind information.
- The pilot of VH-UJS assumed VH-VQG would be using runway 36, as that runway was being used by other aircraft and appeared most suitable for the conditions.
- Because of this assumption, the pilot of VH-UJS relied on visual 'see and avoid' techniques to de-conflict with the inbound aircraft after becoming airborne.
- Critical radio broadcasts on the CTAF were not heard by either aircraft, preventing the establishment of known positions.