Overview
On December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965, a Boeing 757, departed Miami International Airport at approximately 18:34 Eastern Standard Time, bound for Cali, Colombia. The aircraft was conducting a scheduled passenger flight. At around 21:34, while descending to flight level 200 (FL200), the flight crew made contact with Cali Approach Control. The aircraft was then 63 nautical miles from the Cali VOR, which is located about 8 nautical miles south of the airport.
Sequence of Events
Cali Approach cleared the flight for a direct Cali VOR approach and instructed the crew to report at the Tulua VOR. One minute later, the controller issued a clearance for a straight-in VOR DME approach to runway 19, known as the Rozo 1 arrival. The flight crew attempted to select the Rozo NDB (Non-Directional Beacon) on the Flight Management Computer (FMC). Their Jeppesen approach charts listed 'R' as the code for Rozo, so the crew selected that option. However, in the FMC database, 'R' corresponded to Romeo, a navigational aid located 150 nautical miles from Rozo, despite sharing the same radio frequency.
Shortly after passing the Tulua VOR, the aircraft initiated a left turn, as it was following the FMC guidance towards Romeo. This turn deviated from the expected straight-in approach path of the Rozo 1 arrival, causing confusion in the cockpit. Eighty-seven seconds after the turn began, the flight crew engaged Heading Select (HDG SEL), which disengaged LNAV (Lateral Navigation) and prompted a right turn. The left turn had directed the aircraft over mountainous terrain, and a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) alert sounded. The crew applied increased engine power and raised the aircraft's nose in an attempt to climb. However, the spoilers remained deployed. The stick shaker activated shortly before the aircraft struck a mountainside at approximately 8,900 feet elevation. The Cali airport field elevation is 3,153 feet.
Probable Cause
The accident was the consequence of the combination of the following factors: 1. The flightcrew's failure to adequately plan and execute the approach to runway 19 at SKCL and their inadequate use of automation. 2. Failure of the flightcrew to discontinue the approach into Cali, despite numerous cues alerting them of the inadvisability of continuing the approach. 3. The lack of situational awareness of the flightcrew regarding vertical navigation, proximity to terrain, and the relative location of critical radio aids. 4. Failure of the flightcrew to revert to basic radio navigation at the time when the FMS-assisted navigation became confusing and demanded an excessive workload in a critical phase of the flight.