What happened
On 6 November 2005, a Boeing 767-200, registration N653US, was performing a scheduled passenger flight from Philadelphia to London (Gatwick) Airport. During the final approach to Runway 26L, the aircraft's landing gear was not selected for deployment until the aircraft was at approximately 500 ft agl.
As the aircraft descended, the tower controller observed that the landing gear was not down and contacted the crew, advising them to perform a go-around if the gear was not in position. Although the crew replied that the gear was down, the controller noted the gear was still retracted. Following this interaction, the first officer selected the landing gear down. However, the landing flaps were not fully deployed until just seconds before the aircraft touched down. There were no fatalities and no injuries during the landing, and the aircraft sustained no damage.
The investigation
The investigation, which utilized ATC reports, operator records, pilot statements, and flight data recorder analysis, established that the aircraft was being flown with the autopilot and autothrust engaged until 740 ft agl, at which point the commander disconnected the autopilot to fly the aircraft manually.
Flight data revealed that a GPWS Mode 4b alert was active for eleven seconds between 229 ft and 90 ft agl. While the crew's recollections of specific GPWS audio callouts differed, the data confirmed the aircraft was within the alert envelope. The investigation also noted that the landing gear lever was moved to the down position at 500 ft agl, but the gear doors were still open and the gear position disagreed with the lever position at 420 ft agl.
Findings
- The aircraft was not configured for landing in accordance with the operator's stabilized approach criteria by 500 ft agl.
- The delayed selection of the landing gear left very little margin for error or correction.
- The commander's manual flying tasks following the disconnection of the autopilot may have contributed to the failure to notice the gear was not down.
- The safety net provided by the stabilized approach criteria was ineffective, as the crew did not initiate a go-around despite the late configuration.
- The GPWS alerts were also ineffective, as they were either not heard or not acted upon by the crew members.