80 fatalities

1989-07-27: Douglas DC-10 (HL7328) — Korean Air — Tripoli, Libya

Tripoli, LibyaLanding (descent or approach)

On July 27, 1989, a Douglas DC-10 (registration HL7328) operated by Korean Air was involved in an aviation accident near Tripoli, Libya during landing or approach. 80 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Crew fatigue and failure to adhere to approach minimums during low visibility led to a controlled flight into terrain. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781213874Data APIEditorial standards

An aircraft crashed into a residential area short of Tripoli International Airport during an approach in low visibility, resulting in numerous fatalities.

What happened

During an approach to Tripoli International Airport, an aircraft descended below safe altitude limits while operating in weather conditions that fell below established minimums. At the time of the incident, visibility was fluctuating between 100 and 800 feet, and the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for runway 27 was not operational. While on short final, the flight crew did not recognize that the aircraft had descended too low. The plane struck the roof of a building before stalling and crashing into a residential neighborhood approximately 2.4 km before reaching the runway.

The accident resulted in 74 fatalities on board, including four crew members and 70 passengers, along with six deaths on the ground. Additionally, the crash caused injuries to 124 people on the aircraft and several dozen individuals on the ground.

Findings

Investigations into the accident identified several contributing factors related to crew performance and equipment functionality:

  • The flight crew was suffering from fatigue due to insufficient sleep, which impaired their concentration and operational performance. This led to an inadequate briefing regarding the NDB approach and weather conditions.
  • The crew proceeded with the approach despite visibility being below both company and Jeppesen minimums for the NDB Approach, and they failed to adhere to standard procedures. Furthermore, the crew did not correctly interpret visibility information provided by Air Traffic Control, which indicated visibility of only 50 meters.
  • There was a lack of coordination within the cockpit, as the First Officer and Flight Engineer did not follow the Captain's instructions.
  • The GPWS failed to provide continuous warnings while the aircraft was in a dangerous descent toward the terrain. It was noted that recent simulator training had been performed on an aircraft with different equipment configurations, specifically regarding the GPWS functionality.

Probable cause

Crew fatigue and failure to adhere to approach minimums during low visibility led to a controlled flight into terrain.