Casualties unknown

Loss of Watchkeeper Unmanned Air Vehicle WK042 over Cardigan Bay

GB

On February 3, 2017, a Watchkeeper (registration WK042) operated by Royal Navy was involved in an aviation accident near GB. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: of erroneous CAS and the sudden fluctuations in CAS seen at the end of Flight 593, it was necessary to understand how a value of CAS is determined from the Kollsman and Space Age pitot probes. for use by the Flight Control Software (FCS), within the VMSC. This summary draws on records from the UK Defence Safety Authority / Military Aviation Authority (Service Inquiries); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe UK Defence Safety Authority / Military Aviation Authority (Service Inquiries)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-10Data APIEditorial standards

A UK Ministry of Defence Service Inquiry investigated the loss of Watchkeeper UAV WK042 on 3 February 2017 north of West Wales Airport. The inquiry panel convened to examine the circumstances and make recommendations to prevent recurrence.

Incident Overview

On 3 February 2017, a Watchkeeper Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV), designated WK042, was lost over Cardigan Bay, north of West Wales Airport, in West Wales. The incident prompted the Director General of the Defence Safety Authority (DG DSA) to convene a Service Inquiry (SI) under Section 343 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 and in accordance with JSP 832.

Service Inquiry Panel

The SI panel formally convened on 15 February 2017 at the Ministry of Defence Main Building, Whitehall, London. The panel was composed of a Squadron Leader serving as President, a Lieutenant (Royal Navy) as Engineer Member, and a Sergeant as Aircrew Member. Legal advice was provided by a Major from the DSA Legal Advisors (DSA LEGAD), with technical investigation support from the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (Defence AIB).

Terms of Reference

The panel's Terms of Reference (TOR) directed them to investigate and, if possible, determine the cause of the occurrence, along with any contributory, aggravating, or other factors. They were also tasked to examine whether there were significant similarities to the causes identified in the losses of WK031 and WK006, but without further investigating known issues. The TOR required review of applicable policies, orders, and instructions, including environmental limitations and the Aircraft Document Set. Additionally, the panel was to assess the serviceability of relevant equipment, the training and qualifications of individuals involved, and the adequacy of planning and preparation. Recommendations to prevent recurrence were to be submitted to the DG DSA.

Investigation Sequence

The panel worked initially from Defence AIB facilities at Farnborough. The investigation considered the state of serviceability and protective systems, crew competencies, and compliance with applicable regulations. The panel also examined whether any continuing hazards existed that required immediate safety action.

The report of the Service Inquiry was submitted for the Convening Authority's consideration on 20 April 2018. It is classified as Official-Sensitive and is subject to Crown Copyright.