What happened
On March 24, 2003, a Scandinavian Airlines MD-81, registration LN-RMO, was arriving at Bergen Airport Flesland (ENBR) from Oslo. Due to low visibility, the flight initially entered a holding pattern. As conditions improved, the aircraft was cleared for an ILS approach to runway 35.
The pilot flying intended to use the autopilot down to 50 feet radio altitude, following company procedure. While passing approximately 100 feet above the threshold, the aircraft began to drift to the right. The commander disengaged the autopilot and attempted a manual correction using left aileron. During the landing flare, the pilot observed a leftward drift and applied significant right rudder to steer the aircraft back toward the centerline. This resulted in a heavy touchdown on the right main landing gear with a leftward skid. As the aircraft corrected its path, the outer left main wheel struck and broke a runway edge light. There were no injuries among the 107 passengers or the crew, though the aircraft sustained a slashed tire.
The investigation
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority examined the sequence of events, noting that the aircraft was tracking the localizer beams correctly according to flight data. The investigation looked into several environmental and procedural factors at Bergen Airport, including the lack of runway centerline lighting and the use of yellow runway markings instead of the ICAO-standard white. The investigators also reviewed the airline's specific policy regarding autopilot use and landing light usage during night operations in reduced visibility.
Findings
Several contributing factors were identified that led to the excursion:
- A bend in the localizer beam occurred at approximately 100 feet radio altitude when both localizer transmitters were operating simultaneously, causing the initial rightward drift.
- The pilot's manual correction led to an overcorrection toward the left side of the runway.
- The absence of runway centerline lights and the use of non-standard yellow runway markings made it difficult for the crew to maintain visual alignment.
- The airline's policy of not using landing lights during darkness and reduced visibility hindered visual references.
- The commander's decision to continue the landing rather than performing a go-around was a factor, though the investigation noted the difficulty of such decisions during the flare phase.
Safety action
The investigation resulted in several safety recommendations, including calls for the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority to review ILS equipment interlocks, evaluate the requirement for runway centerline lighting at Bergen, and reconsider the use of yellow runway markings. Additionally, recommendations were made for the airline to re-evaluate its procedures regarding autopilot use below CAT I minima and the use of landing lights in low-visibility conditions.