1 fatality

7 Sep 2008: Lindstrand Balloons 150A (N844LB) — Air Venture Balloon Rides, Inc. — Phoenixville, PA

Phoenixville, PA, United States
SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On September 7, 2008, a Lindstrand Balloons USA Model 150A balloon (N844LB) was substantially damaged by fire during a landing in Pennsylvania. The commercial pilot sustained fatal injuries, four passengers were seriously injured, and three suffered minor injuries.

History of Flight

On September 7, 2008, at 1836 eastern daylight time, a Lindstrand Balloons USA Model 150A balloon (N844LB) was substantially damaged by fire during landing near Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. The certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured, four passengers were seriously injured, and three passengers sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The sightseeing flight departed from an empty lot approximately 5 miles from the accident location under 14 CFR Part 91.

Passenger video showed the pilot releasing black helium-type balloons (pibles) to check wind direction, connecting hoses, routing them to the burner, and testing the burner. The envelope was inflated using a portable circular fan. After inflation, ground personnel required seven passengers to quickly enter the two-compartment basket. Two passengers were in the front compartment with the pilot, and five in the rear; one passenger was moved from rear to front. The flight departed at 1807 on a heading of 073 degrees magnetic for a planned one-hour flight.

Passengers reported that the ascent was smooth but the basket was cramped and the burner emitted intense heat and noise. The pilot appeared apprehensive and focused. About 1.9 miles from the accident site, a witness saw the balloon and took photos showing no apparent problems. The pilot informed passengers that wind was taking them toward Phoenixville with few landing areas, so the flight would be cut short. Before landing, the pilot instructed passengers to bend their knees and not exit the basket under any circumstances.

The basket struck tree tops, impacted the ground hard, bounced, tilted, bounced again, uprighted, then tilted over and came to rest on the fuel cylinder side. Passengers reported intense heat after the first bounce. The pilot told everyone to get out. One passenger was thrown from the basket. The pilot attempted to exit but was caught as the basket tilted. The envelope caught fire, and the basket was engulfed in flames.

Chase van personnel heard laughter 10-15 minutes before the accident and noticed the balloon was low over a horse area. They saw the basket ignite after their view was obscured by a house and barn. They attempted to extinguish the fire with portable extinguishers. Communication between the pilot and chase van was not recorded.

Balloon Information

The balloon consisted of a 24-gore A-Type envelope, MINI-T type basket, Lindstrand double burner, Flytec 3040 instrument, two 20-gallon stainless steel fuel tanks, and one 10-gallon aluminum fuel tank. It was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on December 30, 2004, and registered to the operator on March 31, 2005. An annual inspection was recorded on March 28, 2008, with 223.9 hours total time. By September 5, 2008, the balloon had 261.5 total hours. The highest recorded altitude was 4,500 feet msl, with most flights between 1,500 and 2,500 feet msl.

The equipment list included only two stainless steel tanks (serial numbers 599 and 600). One tank's serial number was not listed; the other matched the list. The operator stated the aluminum tank was used primarily for inflation and was positioned on a milk crate with plywood. A quarter-turn shut-off valve was on each stainless steel tank, and a gate-type valve on the aluminum tank. The forward fuel cylinder valve was partially closed; the aft valve was fully open; the aluminum tank valve position was undetermined due to fire damage. The pilot's habit was to leave that valve closed.

Meteorological Information

At 1840, recorded weather at Wings Field Airport (LOM), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, about 18 miles east of the accident site, included winds from 250 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 22°C, dew point 18°C, and altimeter setting 30.00 inches of mercury. GPS data from a similar balloon that departed about 5 minutes earlier on a similar flight path indicated winds generally from the southwest, varying between 3 and 21 mph depending on altitude.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The wreckage was on a 088-degree heading, about 500 feet from a road, in a small sloping field surrounded by trees 45 to 85 feet tall. Impact skid marks were 192 feet west of the main wreckage. The envelope separated from the basket and was 47 feet east. The envelope mouth fabric, nomex, and nylon panels exhibited fire damage. Continuity of control lines could not be confirmed due to fire damage. The basket was composed of stainless steel tubing, padding, plywood, wicker, and rope handles. The fuel compartment contained the three tanks. The aluminum cylinder had melted partially. Fire-damaged components included the burner, vaporization coils, and jet ring.

Medical and Pathological Information

The Chester County Coroner performed an autopsy on September 9, 2008. The cause of death was smoke inhalation and thermal burns. Toxicological testing revealed 28% carbon monoxide and the presence of Metoprolol, which the pilot had not reported on his medical certificate application.

Additional Information

A tank valve from the fuel delivery system was examined; a brass fitting showed overstress fracture. The aluminum tank had a cut-out in the top collar similar to that on Raven/Aerostar 10-gallon Worthington tanks, which were not approved for Lindstrand balloons and were required to be removed from service by Service Bulletin SB 137. The mechanic who performed the last inspection reported that fuel tanks inspected included Lindstrand, Aerostar, and Worthington types; if a manifold to the center tank was present, that tank would not be inspected.

The operator stated they did not perform weight and balance calculations prior to flights because they believed there were no issues with passenger count. The FAA did not require an operations manual; the operator shared best practices through open communication. The pilot made the final decision on flight departure.

The balloon manufacturer's flight manual stated that the balloon must not be flown if modified without approval; passengers must be completely briefed and in the basket before takeoff; pilot lights should be turned off and fuel valves closed before touchdown. The flight manual also provided guidance for heavy landings and ground fire procedures. The Balloon Flying Handbook advised passenger briefings before inflation and proper landing posture.

Contributing factors

Causes

Balloon/dirigible structures — Failure

Other contributing factors

PilotIncorrect service/maintenanceOperator