History of Flight
On September 25, 2009, about 2331 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter AS350 B2, registration N417AE, lost control and impacted terrain near Georgetown County Airport (GGE), Georgetown, South Carolina. The helicopter was operated by Omniflight Helicopters Incorporated, doing business as Carolina Life Care, under 14 CFR Part 91 as a helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) positioning flight. Night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed; the flight operated on a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. The flight originated from Charleston Air Force Base/International Airport (CHS) about 2302, destined for Conway-Horry County Airport (HYW).
The helicopter had departed its base at HYW about 2023 for an interfacility patient transfer from Georgetown Memorial Hospital to the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) in Charleston. After landing at Georgetown Memorial Hospital about 2041, it departed for MUSC about 2107, landed about 2135, and dropped off the patient. After refueling, the helicopter departed MUSC about 2225 for CHS, landing about 2232. About 2302, the pilot advised MUSC flight control he was departing CHS for HYW with 2 hours 45 minutes of fuel, flying at 1,500 feet mean sea level (msl), estimating arrival at HYW about 2347.
About 2305, the helicopter departed CHS eastbound. The pilot requested and received flight-following to Mount Pleasant Regional Airport-Faison Field (LRO). About 2309, the pilot reported LRO in sight, and ATC terminated flight following. The helicopter turned northeast past LRO toward HYW. About 2316, the pilot advised MUSC flight control the flight was at 1,000 feet msl, 110 knots, estimating arrival in 29 minutes. No further communications were received.
About 15 minutes later, the MUSC communications specialist initiated contact efforts after no in-flight update. With no response, the specialist activated the emergency action plan and contacted Omniflight's Operational Control Center (OCC). About 0012 the next day, the last known position was plotted. The helicopter was located about 0206 by Georgetown County sheriff's deputies about 2 miles southwest of GGE.
Personnel Information
The pilot, age 45, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and multiengine land, rotorcraft helicopter, instrument airplane, and instrument helicopter. He was Omniflight’s HYW base manager. Before joining Omniflight in 2005, he accrued 3,736 flight hours as a naval aviator in the U.S. Marine Corps. He had experience flying helicopters in IMC and had been instrument current at one time, but Omniflight’s AS350 B2 operations were VFR, so he was not required to be instrument current. His last Part 135 airman competency/proficiency check on December 12, 2008, included satisfactory demonstration of inadvertent IMC recovery. His latest FAA second-class medical certificate was issued July 21, 2009, with no restrictions; he reported 4,600 total flight hours.
From September 22-24, the pilot worked day shifts (0800-2000). On September 25, he switched to night shift (scheduled 2000-0800). His wife reported he ate and slept normally before going on duty.
Aircraft Information
The accident helicopter was a 2000 Eurocopter AS350 B2 with a three-blade main rotor and two-blade tail rotor, powered by a Turbomeca Arriel 1D1 turboshaft engine. It was configured for HEMS and equipped with a Sky Connect flight tracking system. The helicopter was not FAA-approved for IMC operations but had sufficient instruments for inadvertent IMC. It lacked onboard weather radar, night vision imaging, autopilot, and a helicopter terrain awareness and warning system. The most recent 500-hour inspection was completed September 17, 2009, at 2,967.3 total hours.
Meteorological Information
Per Omniflight's 135 Operations Manual, the pilot-in-command was responsible for obtaining weather information before flights. Weather data obtained by the accident pilot before the flight was not recovered. Based on OCC launch approval and pilot reports, weather at takeoff and along the route was visual meteorological conditions (VMC). About 2242, an MUSC specialist spoke with an OCC coordinator, who indicated they would review weather with the pilot for the return flight if he called before takeoff. The pilot did not call, and the OCC did not contact him.
A Savannah base manager and pilot, also flying in South Carolina that night, stated the weather was deteriorating but forecast above minimums. While refueling, the accident pilot contacted him by radio, stating that “bad thunderstorms” were in the GGE area and he was unsure he could return to HYW. The Savannah pilot advised he could stay at the CHS base. After departure from Greenville, the Savannah pilot encountered worse weather than forecast and returned to the hospital; he informed the accident pilot that ceiling and visibility were dropping fast in the Greenville area, about 230 miles west.
Weather observations at CHS before departure recorded VMC: wind 020° at 11 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered 2,000 feet, broken 6,000 and 8,000 feet, temperature 26°C, dew point 23°C, altimeter 30.09 inches. About 20 minutes after departure, light rain moved onto the field from the north.
Weather reports near the accident site were unavailable because the GGE automated weather station had been out of service for about 6 weeks. Witnesses observed the helicopter at about 1,000 feet above ground level (agl), with searchlight turning on and off, paralleling U.S. Route 17 northbound in moderate to heavy rain.
Terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAF) for Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), 29 nm northeast, issued about 1928, indicated marginal VFR through 0100 on September 26. An amended TAF about 2207 expected IFR conditions after midnight with broken ceiling at 700 feet agl and light drizzle and mist.
Station models and weather depiction charts showed a frontal boundary over Charleston about 2300, with surface wind from the north at about 10 knots near the accident site. Depiction charts at 2100 showed VFR along the route, but by 2400, MVFR to IFR conditions over the route with IFR over MYR and central/northern South Carolina.
Radar data and weather observations revealed the helicopter entered convective activity after passing LRO. The University Corporation for Atmospheric Research regional radar mosaic chart for 2333 showed large echoes north of the frontal boundary with thunderstorms and rain showers over the flight route. Several defined cells surrounded the accident site.
Astronomical data: at accident time, the moon was at 3.6° elevation, 50% illuminated, but satellite imagery indicated the moon was not visible during the flight.
Flight Recorders
The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder. The Sky Connect tracking system transmitted position, speed, and altitude. Data showed the helicopter cruised at varying altitudes, never reaching a steady cruise. Peak GPS altitude was 1,558 feet for about 1 minute; most of the flight was below 1,000 feet, with the last 8 minutes mostly below 800 feet. Lowest recorded altitude during last cruise was 627 feet.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The last radar and Sky Connect target was about 1.92 nm southwest of GGE, coinciding with the wreckage location. The helicopter struck a tree before impacting terrain and came to rest inverted in sawdust and loose soil on a magnetic heading of 156°. The debris path was about 22 feet long and 39 feet wide, with a 3-foot deep crater beneath the main wreckage. A postcrash fire consumed most of the helicopter; surrounding trees were scorched to approximately 30 feet.
All major components were present. Examination revealed no evidence of preimpact failures or malfunctions of the engine, drive train, main rotor, tail rotor, or structure. No indication of in-flight fire. The fuselage showed heavy crush and compression damage. The starflex hub was undamaged. Main rotor blades had varying impact damage. Tail rotor impact fingers were bent in; tail rotor blades and components had no significant damage. Control systems showed fractures consistent with overload. Surviving flight instruments included an attitude indicator with rotational scoring, a turn and slip indicator needle fused in left-turn position, HSI bug at 198° and HSI at 120°, radar altimeter bug at 200 feet. Engine instruments showed T4 indicating about 600°C, torque about 45%. The engine was damaged by impact and fire; evidence of rotation was observed at compressor and power turbine blades. Engine accessories showed overload fractures.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy performed on the pilot at MUSC reported cause of death as thermal injuries. Toxicological testing at the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory showed negative results for carbon monoxide, cyanide, basic, acidic, and neutral drugs.
Additional Information
Operational control and flight following were provided by Omniflight’s OCC in Addison, Texas; two regional communications centers in Kennesaw, Georgia, and Mesa, Arizona; and the MUSC communications center. The OCC monitored weather, flight plans, and airworthiness, and approved flights. The communications centers directed missions and had real-time tracking via Sky Connect. MUSC had a policy manual for dispatching, flight following, and postaccident actions, and Omniflight provided an emergency action plan with missing/overdue aircraft procedures.