History of Flight
On May 30, 2020, at approximately 1132 central daylight time, a Schweizer 269C-1 helicopter, registration N9421P, was destroyed during a solo instructional flight near Ozark, Alabama. The student pilot was fatally injured. The flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
Earlier that morning, around 0900, the student pilot met his flight instructor at Eagle Aviation Academy, located at a private heliport in Midland, Alabama. The instructor performed a preflight inspection and later waited while the student pilot conducted his own preflight. They took off at about 0906 for a dual lesson that included confined area exercises, steep approaches, maximum performance takeoffs, and autorotations. After about 1.4 hours of flight time, they landed back at the school around 1035. The instructor performed a post-flight walk-around and supervised refueling by the student pilot.
The student pilot then prepared for a solo flight of about 1.1 hours, planned for local approaches and takeoffs at Ozark-Blackwell Field Airport (71J). He took off around 1110. Security cameras at 71J captured the helicopter performing takeoffs and landings on runway 31 around 1115 and again near 1131. A witness near a residential area about 1 mile from the departure end of runway 31 reported hearing the helicopter sputtering, observed it turn back, then heard the engine sounds cease and saw the helicopter dive rapidly and impact the ground.
Personnel Information
The student pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on February 15, 2019, with 340 total flight hours reported. According to the flight instructor, the student pilot had accrued about 66.9 total hours at the flight school, including 26.3 hours of dual instruction and 8.9 hours of solo helicopter flight time.
Aircraft Information
The helicopter was manufactured in 2000. Maintenance records showed it was purchased in non-flyable storage condition in July 2018 and reassembled with new, reconditioned, and overhauled components. Its most recent 50-hour inspection was completed on April 4, 2020, at 5,387.4 total hours; the engine had 1,720 hours since major overhaul.
Postaccident examination revealed that a tail rotor gearbox (P/N z369-A-5400 “E”, S/N 87083) manufactured for Hughes Tool Company was installed. This component was prohibited for use on the helicopter per the FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet and was not listed in the manufacturer’s illustrated parts catalog or Schweizer’s Mandatory Service Notice for part number conversions.
According to the Schweizer 269C-1 Rotorcraft Flight Manual, illumination of the amber FUEL LOW caution light indicated approximately one gallon of usable fuel remaining, and the pilot was instructed to land immediately.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site showed no evidence of fire or explosion. The helicopter struck a 60- to 70-foot-tall tree before coming to rest. Tree limbs up to 8 inches in diameter were broken. Significant oil leakage from the engine was noted. The main rotor blades remained attached to the hub with upward bending and chordwise wrinkling; leading edges were predominantly undisturbed. The tail boom separated from its mounting location and was found near the main wreckage; the tail rotor gearbox remained attached to the tailboom with minimal damage.
The instrument panel was bent forward. The fuel low caution light system was placarded as inoperative. The fuel tank was impact damaged with no evidence of residual fuel; the fuel tank filler cap was found hanging by its chain. No odor of fuel or vegetation browning was observed. The carburetor float bowl was devoid of fuel.
Examination of the fuel sensor revealed corrosion on fasteners and calibration screws, and the aluminum probe shaft was missing. The fuel strainer contained debris but the screen was clear. The fuel cap was heavily rusted and would not provide positive friction to remain in place.
The engine remained partially attached. Both magnetos were separated; the left magneto produced spark from all towers when rotated, while the right magneto did not due to internal impact damage and water ingress. The carburetor was fractured and impact separated.
Flight control continuity was largely confirmed, but the cyclic control was disconnected fore and aft due to an impact-fractured casting. The collective controls appeared connected before impact. The tail rotor drive shaft was sheared but showed no twisting; tail rotor blades showed no leading edge damage.
Additional Information
Interviews revealed that the flight school typically placarded the fuel low caution light as inoperative on both its Schweizer helicopters. The flight instructor stated the fuel gauge was not 100% accurate. He estimated the fuel tank contained about 20 gallons before the dual flight and that the student pilot refueled the helicopter afterward, though he did not observe the student secure the fuel cap. The flight school owner later stated the placard on the accident helicopter was placed by mistake, as the inoperative light belonged to another helicopter (N2074C), and the accident helicopter's fuel low light was functioning properly. However, no maintenance logbook entries were found deferring the system under the MMEL.
The Federal Aviation Administration's Master Minimum Equipment List for the helicopter allowed the fuel low caution light to be inoperative if procedures for monitoring fuel quantity were established and used. No such procedures were documented in the maintenance records.
Postmortem examination determined the cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicology testing was negative for carboxyhemoglobin, ethanol, glucose, or drugs.