Piper PA-34 accident at East Rutherford, New Jersey, 23 Sept 1981 (N8110R)

Accident narrative

**Midair Collision over East Rutherford**

About 0847 e.d.t. on September 23, 1981, a Ronson Aviation Bell 206B helicopter and a Seminole Air Charter Piper PA-34 airplane collided in flight at an altitude of about 650 feet over the Meadowlands Sports Complex in East Rutherford, New Jersey. The collision occurred about 2 nautical miles south of the Teterboro Airport. The helicopter fell into the sports complex parking lot, killing both crewmembers. The airplane, missing its right engine and part of its left wing, made a gear-up landing in a marsh about seven-tenths of a mile east of the collision point. The airplane pilot was seriously injured and his passenger received minor injuries.

**The flight**

The Piper PA-34-200T Seneca II, N8110R, departed Rochester, New York, about 0720 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan for Teterboro. The pilot had accumulated about 3,100 hours of flying time. He was accompanied by one passenger, a private pilot.

The Bell 206B helicopter, N27670, departed Linden, New Jersey, about 0826 and stopped at Woodbridge, New Jersey, to refuel. It departed Woodbridge on a direct visual flight rules (VFR) course to Teterboro. The captain had about 6,700 flying hours, and the first officer had about 1,602 hours.

**The sequence of events**

The weather was generally clear, with scattered clouds at about 6,000 feet and 30 miles visibility.

As the two aircraft approached Teterboro, the local controller—who was also the facility's tower chief—received a telephone call concerning an administrative problem at 0843:45. The call lasted until 0845:44. During these two minutes, both aircraft made their initial radio contacts with the tower. The controller acknowledged the helicopter at 0845:01 by saying "helicopter stand by," but he did not acknowledge the airplane's initial call at 0845:22. He also missed several transmissions from other aircraft.

After ending the telephone call, the controller acknowledged the airplane at 0845:56, requesting that the flight report over the outer marker for a left base leg to runway 1. The airplane passenger later stated that the pilot did not turn on the marker beacon receiver until the controller requested the report. By the time the receiver was activated and receiving the signal, the pilot was unable to report his position due to congestion on the radio frequency, which had become busy with transmissions missed during the controller's telephone call.

At 0846:27, the helicopter reported "coming up on the sports complex." The controller requested a report "about a mile south, I don't have you in sight." The controller later stated he considered the phrase "coming up on" to mean about a quarter-mile from a point. However, radar data showed the helicopter was actually 1.6 miles south of the stadium at that time.

At 0847:08, the airplane pilot reported he was inside the marker on a left base for runway 1. The controller replied that he had the airplane in sight. The helicopter was about one mile east of the airplane at this time. The controller issued no safety advisories to either aircraft.

At 0847:34, the aircraft collided. Witnesses stated the aircraft converged at an angle of nearly 90 degrees, with the helicopter approaching from the right and appearing to bank right immediately before the collision. Both occupants of the airplane stated they never saw the helicopter.

**What the investigation found**

The helicopter's main wreckage was consumed by ground fire in the parking lot. The airplane's right engine and the outboard 8 feet of its left wing separated in flight and were found in the scatter pattern without fire damage. Cuts on the airplane's separated wing and damage to the helicopter's main rotor blades indicated that the helicopter was slightly below the airplane as they converged. The Board found that at the moment of collision, the helicopter rotor disk was banked at an angle of about 45 degrees to the airplane's right wing, with the rotor hub below and forward of the right wing leading edge.

A cockpit visibility study using binocular photographs indicated that each aircraft would have been visible to the crew of the other. The airplane would have been in the binocular vision envelope of the helicopter copilot's windshield for most of the approach, though the pilot in the right seat would have had to look nearly 90 degrees to his left to see it. The helicopter would have been visible from the airplane, though partially obstructed by the right windshield post, wing, and nacelle. The airplane passenger stated he had been leaning forward and scanning ahead and to the right, particularly looking for aircraft from the southeast. The Board noted that this emphasis would have directed his attention away from the helicopter's actual position to the south.

The Board concluded that the controller had an erroneous perception of the relative positions of the two aircraft. Because the airplane pilot did not report at the outer marker, the controller believed the airplane was farther out on the approach than it actually was. Conversely, he interpreted the helicopter's vague position report to mean it was nearly over the stadium, much closer to the airport than it was. Consequently, he did not consider the aircraft to be in conflict.

The investigation noted that the controller had been distracted by a nonessential administrative telephone call. The Board concluded that he did not assign proper priorities to the requirements of his position, allowing the traffic situation to get ahead of him and causing the frequency congestion that delayed the airplane's position report.

The tower was equipped with a BRITE radar display connected to the Newark approach radar. It was turned on at the time of the accident, but the controller was not using it. The Board found that the Federal Aviation Administration had not certified the Teterboro controllers to use the BRITE radar. The Board concluded that if the controller had been certified and had used the display to update himself after his distraction, he might have perceived the conflict.

Postmortem examinations of the helicopter pilots and a review of the airplane pilot's medical records disclosed no evidence of preexisting physiological problems. The controller was taking prescribed antihypertensive medication, but there was no evidence that medical issues affected his performance.

**Probable cause**

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "the failure of each flightcrew to see and avoid the other aircraft and the failure of the local controller to perceive the traffic conflict due to the controller's preoccupation with a nonessential administrative telephone call."

The Board found that contributing to the accident was "a delayed position report from the airplane pilot due to his failure to activate his marker beacon receiver and to controller-induced congestion on the radio frequency and an inaccurate position report from the helicopter pilot." The failure of the FAA to train and qualify tower personnel in the use of the BRITE radar display was also determined to be a factor.