Fokker F27-100 accident at Jamaica, New York, 13 Jan 1984

Accident narrative

On January 13, 1984, at 1442, Pilgrim Airlines Flight 35, a Fokker F27-100, experienced dual engine power losses immediately after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in Jamaica, New York. The airplane struck the runway before its landing gear could fully extend and slid approximately 1,200 feet. Of the 24 people aboard, the captain and 13 passengers received minor injuries, and the flight attendant sustained a fractured spine. The airplane was substantially damaged, but there was no postcrash fire.

### The flight

Flight 35 was a scheduled passenger flight to Ottawa, Canada. The airplane had arrived at JFK at 1346 as Flight 215 from Groton, Connecticut. During the inbound flight, the crew encountered light icing conditions at 4,000 feet. The captain stated that the ice disappeared as the airplane descended to 3,000 feet, and the wing de-icing and engine anti-icing systems were not used.

The 1351 surface weather observation at JFK included a measured ceiling of 2,700 feet overcast, visibility of 7 miles, a temperature of 26°F, and winds from 050° at 14 knots.

During the preflight inspection, the captain observed a narrow strip of ice, 1 to 1 1/2 inches wide and less than 1/16 inch deep, along the leading edges of both wings. He stated that in his opinion, the amount of ice did not warrant deicing the wings before takeoff. The F-27 engine air inlets are partially covered by the propeller nose cone and require a ladder for proper inspection; the captain did not use a ladder to inspect the engine inlet cowls.

Twenty-one passengers, including a 3-month-old infant and a 2 1/2-year-old child, boarded the airplane. The first officer occupied the right seat and was at the controls for the takeoff.

At 1441:46, Flight 35 was cleared for takeoff on runway 4L. The takeoff roll was normal. At 1442:12, the captain called the rotation speeds. When the airplane was 50 to 100 feet above the runway, the first officer called for the landing gear to be raised. Concurrently, the left engine RPM decreased and the left engine autofeather light illuminated. The captain raised the landing gear and stated, "Left engine, we just lost it."

At 1442:26, the captain said, "Okay, let's feather the left one, power lever back." One second later, the cockpit voice recorder captured the sound of decreasing right engine RPM. The captain later stated that his verbal reference to the power lever was a momentary mental lapse, as that was the feathering procedure for a different airplane he flew, and that he made no move to pull the left power lever back. He stated that as he placed his hand on the high pressure fuel cock for the left engine—the correct F-27 procedure—power was lost on the right engine before he could move the control.

At 1442:30, the local controller transmitted that heavy smoke was coming from the right engine. The captain transmitted that they were going to land, and the sound of landing gear actuation was recorded. The airplane landed on the runway with the gear unlocked and in transit to the down position. It touched down about 6,000 feet from the threshold, slid 600 feet on the runway, and slid another 600 feet through the snow before stopping.

The flight attendant, who felt severe back pain upon impact, deliberately unfastened her restraints as the airplane slid, lay on the cabin floor, and shouted evacuation instructions. The evacuation was completed in less than 70 seconds.

### What the investigation found

Investigators examining the airplane less than an hour after the accident observed a band of ice 1/2 inch thick and 1 1/2 to 2 inches wide on the leading edges of both wings and the stabilizers. There was also a 1/2-inch buildup of ice on the captain's windshield wiper post.

The flight controls were jammed because the lower part of the fuselage was pushed upward, but no failures were found in the control system. Both engines and propellers remained attached. The left propeller was in the feathered position. The right propeller blades had curled rearward and turned toward the feathered position.

The Safety Board tested both engines in a test cell. Both produced acceptable shaft horsepower, and all fuel system components were intact and capable of supplying fuel. The propeller autofeather and manual feather systems, as well as their electrical circuits, were tested and functioned normally.

The airplane's engine anti-ice system uses electrical heating elements. The F-27 operations manual and the engine manual warn that if icing conditions are encountered before the system is switched on, there is a possibility of flame extinction shortly after the system starts operating, because large pieces of ice can break off and pass into the engine.

The flightcrew had turned on the engine anti-ice system for takeoff at JFK, but the system is designed so that the heating elements do not activate until weight is removed from the landing gear. The Board concluded that the left engine power loss and autofeather most likely resulted from an ingestion of ice from the engine inlet cowl, which became dislodged upon rotation through the normal operation of the anti-ice system.

The Board believed that the loss of power on the right engine was not caused by actions of the flightcrew. Flight tests did not produce evidence indicating the captain mistakenly moved the right engine controls. Because the right engine was exposed to the same conditions, the Board concluded it most likely also experienced a power loss when ice was ingested after the application of the anti-ice system.

The Board believed the captain's preflight inspection was inadequate, as he failed to observe the substantial ice accumulation noted after the accident and made no attempt to remove it. The Board also found that Pilgrim Airlines training taught a different procedure for propeller autofeather during takeoff than the airline's flight manual.

During the evacuation, several survival factors were noted. The cargo door jammed partially due to impact damage. In the rear cabin, the commode broke free and blocked the floor-level emergency exit. Additionally, when passengers attempted to assume a brace position by resting their heads on their arms against the seatback in front of them, the seatbacks folded over, providing no support.

### Probable cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "the flightcrew's failure to use engine anti-ice on the inbound flight to JFK, the captain's failure to conduct a thorough preflight inspection, and the flightcrew's decision to use engine anti-ice on takeoff from JFK which led to power losses on both engines."