Incident Overview
During the descent into Brisbane, an aircraft encountered severe turbulence approximately 5–6 minutes after the captain initiated cabin preparations. The captain had observed a graphical area forecast indicating the possibility of moderate to severe turbulence but did not see weather radar returns or receive pilot reports confirming such conditions. The captain contacted the customer service manager (CSM) to check on the cabin crew's progress and to guide the timing of the seatbelt sign illumination, but did not provide any weather-related information. Two minutes later, the seatbelt sign was illuminated and a 'seatbelt' public announcement (PA) was made. However, no 'turbulence' PA was performed, as the captain visually assessed an approaching cumulus cloud and determined it did not pose an immediate hazard due to lack of radar indications.
Communication Lapses
The captain followed normal descent procedures but did not discuss additional weather-related information with the CSM. The cabin crew, who relied on information from the flight crew, were unaware of the increased likelihood of turbulence. The captain's decision not to communicate expected turbulence was likely due to not knowing the severity of the turbulence. The absence of indications of the subsequent severity limited the captain's perception of the threat, so additional precautions were not considered.
Cabin Crew Actions
When the seatbelt sign was illuminated, cabin crew were required to perform duties while unrestrained. The CSM and R2P were checking lavatories as part of securing the cabin. The captain performed the 'seatbelts' PA, which indicated unanticipated light turbulence, but the cabin crew did not recall hearing it. The turbulence event occurred less than one minute after the seatbelt sign illumination, leaving the cabin crew insufficient time to become seated and restrained. Three cabin crew were unrestrained during the severe turbulence and all three received injuries.
Aftermath
After the turbulence, the CSM and L2P attended to the R2P, who was on the floor of the aft galley unable to move due to injury. Due to the late stage of descent, there was little time for first aid and landing preparations. The CSM, L2P, and passengers assisting were reluctant to return to their seats despite the captain's instructions. This disruption caused the CSM and L2P to focus on first aid rather than completing the callback and silent review before landing.