What happened
In 2025, two separate incidents occurred at Brisbane International Airport involving the Gate 82 aerobridge. On 18 June, a Boeing 737, registration VH-VZG, was struck by the aerobridge. A second collision involving a Boeing 737, registration DQ-FAE, occurred on 26 July 2025. In both instances, the aerobridge collided with the aircraft cockpit windshield, causing minor damage. There were no injuries reported during either event.
The investigation
The investigation examined the operational procedures and equipment design at the terminal. It was found that the design of the Gate 82 walls and windows, combined with the specific parking position of narrow-body aircraft, created a significant blind spot for operators at the control console. Unlike other aerobridges at the airport, Gate 8 and 82 lacked side-viewing windows, meaning operators could only see what was directly in front of the cab.
Furthermore, the investigation looked into the movement of the bridge. While operators intended to move the bridge parallel to the aircraft, they were actually rotating the cab to the left during the extension process. This rotation changed the direction of travel from parallel to diagonal. The joystick design required operators to perform a complex mental rotation to account for this change in orientation, a task that was not adequately understood by the crew.
Findings
- The home position and cab orientation, paired with a lack of side windows, restricted the operator's ability to see narrow-body aircraft along the docking path.
- It was common practice for operators to begin extending the bridge without first establishing a visual reference to the aircraft.
- The rotation of the cab to the left changed the relative joystick direction, creating a complex mental rotation task that led the bridge to move diagonally toward the aircraft.
- Training materials and in-cab instructions from the Brisbane Airport Corporation did not explicitly mandate that operators must gain and maintain visibility of the aircraft before initiating movement.
- Existing safety features failed to activate because they were not designed to detect an approach from a side angle.