16 fatalities

1971-01-02: De Havilland DH.106 Comet (SU-ALC) — United Arab Airlines — Tripoli, Libya

Tripoli, LibyaLanding (descent or approach)

On January 2, 1971, a De Havilland DH.106 Comet (registration SU-ALC) operated by United Arab Airlines was involved in an aviation accident near Tripoli, Libya during landing or approach. 16 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's decision to attempt a landing in visibility below company minimums while flying at an insufficient altitude for the ADF approach procedure led to the impact with terrain. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781235605Data APIEditorial standards

A scheduled international flight from Algiers to Cairo crashed while attempting to land at Tripoli, resulting in the deaths of all 16 people on board.

What happened

On a scheduled service traveling from Algiers to Cairo via Tripoli, the de Havilland Comet experienced several delays prior to its departure. The outbound leg had been delayed by 29 hours because of poor weather along the flight path. During pre-flight checks in Algiers, a fire warning light for the number 3 engine's Zone I remained illuminated. Maintenance staff, who lacked specific experience with this aircraft type, attempted repairs, which added another two and a half hours to the delay. Although the pilot considered canceling the flight, the light eventually turned off, and the decision was made to continue.

Upon entering the Tripoli Control Area, the crew received a weather report indicating horizontal visibility of 1000 meters due to sand haze. While this visibility was below the airline's established minimums, vertical visibility remained unlimited. The pilot decided to attempt a landing at Tripoli with Malta as an alternative, noting a remaining endurance of 3 hours and 50 minutes. Air traffic controllers provided a QNH of 1008 mb and suggested that visibility might be better than 1000 meters.

At the time, the airport's VOR was out of service for calibration, leaving only the ADF as an available ground aid. The approach to Runway 18 required a teardrop turn via an ADF procedure turn after passing a beacon located 0.6 NM north of the runway. After initially reporting at 3,000 feet, the aircraft's last communication occurred while passing the beacon on the outbound leg of the procedure turn. The aircraft subsequently struck sand dunes at an elevation of 395 ft, roughly 7 km from the runway threshold. The impact destroyed the de Havilland Comet, and there were 16 fatalities.

Findings

  • The pilot decided to proceed with a landing attempt despite visibility being below the airline's required minimums for that location at night.
  • The aircraft was flying at an altitude lower than necessary for the prescribed ADF approach procedure.
  • Adverse weather conditions, specifically sand haze, acted as a contributing factor to the accident.

Probable cause

The pilot's decision to attempt a landing in visibility below company minimums while flying at an insufficient altitude for the ADF approach procedure led to the impact with terrain.