No fatalities

Asymmetric Fuel Quantities Precede Forced Landing in Soft Earth Field (N33PV)

Gratwich, United KingdomFlight

On June 3, 2001, a Partenavia P.68 (registration N33PV) operated by Southern Aircraft Consultancy was involved in an aviation accident near Gratwich, United Kingdom in flight. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The accident arose partly through significantly asymmetric fuel quantities in the two wing tanks before the aircraft took off. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 5 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards

Aircraft crash-lands after right engine fails due to fuel starvation; pilot critically injured. Investigation reveals only left tank was refueled before departure, leading to asymmetric fuel loads.

Flight History

The five occupants departed Guernsey on 24 May, flying directly to Vannes, Normandy. The aircraft cruised at 2,350 RPM and 32 inches manifold pressure, achieving 140 KIAS. The flight lasted 50 minutes in still air. After parking at Vannes for several days, the aircraft departed on 31 May for Meaux, east of Paris, a 254 nm flight lasting 2 hours 5 minutes. No fuel was added at Vannes.

Refuelling Events

On 3 June, the accident day, the owner taxied to the aero club's fuel pumps at Meaux. She believed she may have dipped the tanks before refuelling but could not recall the quantities. She then left the aircraft to file a flight plan, check weather, and pay charges. The fuel receipt documented 157 litres of 100LL AVGAS. The refuelling operator filled the left wing tank, then moved to the right but was instructed by a family member that refuelling the right tank was unnecessary, as its gauge indicated two-thirds full. Another family member later confirmed this. The pilot did not dip the tanks after returning. She recalled the right gauge showing "almost full" and left "a bit less". She planned to fly to a Liverpool airstrip, where three occupants would disembark, then return to Henstridge—both legs without refuelling, based on a full-tank endurance of about six hours.

The Accident Flight

The aircraft departed Meaux at 1020 hrs, flying visually via Compiegne, Abbeville, Lydd, Clacton, and Cambridge. The autopilot remained disengaged; the pilot noted no abnormal roll or fuel gauge readings. At 1246 hrs, at 3,500 ft south of Leicester, she contacted East Midlands Approach for a Flight Information Service. At 1312 hrs, she transmitted a Mayday stating she had "lost" the right engine. The controller advised Tatenhill airfield 10 miles behind. She turned right. About one minute later, she reported "I HAVE NO ENGINES NOW" then "TO DO A FORCED LANDING PAPA VICTOR, OH NO IT'S GOING AGAIN". The controller continued vectors. At 1315:40 hrs, 10 miles northwest of Tatenhill at 2,800 ft, she reported "NO ENGINES ... WE'LL HAVE TO FIND A FIELD". Her final transmission at 1316:50 hrs was "I HAVE A HI... HILL ERM A FIELD ON A". The pilot later recalled little of the final glide.

Emergency and Forced Landing

The aircraft passed low beside a farmhouse and crash-landed in a field of soft earth with a significant up-slope. The pilot sustained critical injuries and was heavily sedated for an extended period. Her memory of the refuelling process at Meaux was limited. Investigation determined that the right engine's power loss was consistent with fuel exhaustion from the right wing tank, which had not been replenished since Guernsey. The left engine later ran intermittently as air from the empty right tank reached it, leaving the pilot no option but to force-land. The pilot chose a brown field to avoid overturning in standing crop. The upward slope, soft earth, and clean wing configuration contributed to a heavy landing.

Investigation Findings

The official probable cause states that the accident arose partly through significantly asymmetric fuel quantities in the two wing tanks before takeoff. The pilot may have been unaware that only the left tank was replenished, as she left during refuelling. The club accepted payment only by French cheque or cash; the pilot paid in cash, appearing to spend all remaining French currency, but her family still had funds. No explanation was offered for how 157 litres were ordered before delivery without specific instructions. The pilot's instructions to a family member were to fill the right tank to within two inches of the filler neck if the left was between half and two-thirds full; she later believed there may have been confusion between left and right. It was noted that the pilot was unaware of any roll tendency after takeoff, and the fuel gauges did not indicate low contents. A mis-positioned fuel selector valve also prevented use of remaining fuel in the left tank for the right engine. The pilot did not feather the right propeller (though it was found feathered) and touched down with flaps retracted. The tone of her radio transmissions indicated she was coping well, and the air traffic controller's performance was exemplary.