Event Sequence
During landing rollout deceleration, the captain deployed the thrust reversers asymmetrically and subsequently failed to maintain directional control. The airplane veered off the runway, resulting in collapse of the nose gear and damage to the forward fuselage. After leaving the paved surface and entering the dirt infield, the nose gear strut collapsed, and the aircraft slid to a stop in a nose-down pitch attitude approximately 7,650 feet from the runway threshold. No fire occurred.
Aircraft Condition
Several days before the event, maintenance personnel had rendered the #1 thrust reverser inoperative and mechanically locked it in the stowed position. The airplane continued in service under approved minimum equipment list (MEL) procedures, with a conspicuous placard placed next to the engine's thrust lever indicating the inoperative status.
Crew Actions
The inbound crew briefed the captain about the #1 thrust reverser status when the accident crew took over the aircraft. The captain served as the flying pilot for the leg. Touchdown occurred on the runway centerline about 1,200 feet beyond the threshold. The captain moved both thrust levers into the reverse position, and the airplane began yawing right. In an attempt to maintain directional control, the captain moved the #1 thrust lever out of reverse but inadvertently placed it into the Take-Off/Go-Around (TOGA) position while leaving the #2 thrust lever in full reverse. The resulting thrust asymmetry—left engine at TOGA power and right engine at full reverse—greatly increased the right yaw forces, which were not adequately compensated by rudder and brake inputs.
Company procedures required the flying pilot to give an approach and landing briefing to the nonflying pilot (first officer). The captain did not brief the first officer regarding the thrust reverser's MEL status, nor was that briefing specifically required by the company operations manual. The first officer did not remind the captain of the status, and no specific requirement existed for such a reminder. The operations manual stated the approach briefing should include items like landing flap setting, target airspeed, autobrake level (if desired), and any special problems. The airline's crew resource management procedures tasked the nonflying pilot to be supportive and back up the flying pilot if pertinent items were omitted.
Investigation Findings
Investigators evaluated the maintenance, repair history, and functionality of components related to directional control, including the brake system, nose landing gear strut and wheels, brakes, antiskid system, thrust levers and reversers, and the throttle control unit. No discrepancies were found regarding these components.