Background
Several days before the flight, maintenance personnel had rendered the #1 thrust reverser inoperative and mechanically locked it in the stowed position. In accordance with the approved minimum equipment list (MEL), the airplane was allowed to continue in service with a conspicuous placard noting the inoperative status, placed next to the engine's thrust lever. When the crew took over the airplane at the departure airport, the inbound crew briefed the captain on the status of the #1 thrust reverser.
Event
During the landing rollout, the captain, who was the flying pilot, touched down on the runway centerline approximately 1,200 feet beyond the threshold. He moved both thrust levers into the reverse position, causing the airplane to begin yawing right. In an effort to maintain directional control, the captain moved the #1 thrust lever out of reverse but inadvertently placed it into the Take-Off/Go-Around (TOGA) position, while leaving the #2 thrust lever in full reverse. This configuration resulted in a thrust asymmetry, with the left engine at TOGA power and the right engine in full reverse, greatly increasing the right yaw forces. The crew's application of rudder and brake inputs was insufficient to compensate. The airplane veered off the runway onto the dirt infield, where the nose gear strut collapsed. The airplane slid to a stop in a nose-down pitch attitude approximately 7,650 feet from the runway threshold. There was no fire.
Crew Coordination and Procedures
Company procedures required the flying pilot (the captain) to provide an approach and landing briefing to the non-flying pilot (first officer). The captain did not brief the first officer regarding the thrust reverser's MEL status, nor was he specifically required to do so by the company operations manual. Similarly, the first officer did not remind the captain of its status, as there was no specific requirement. The operations manual stated that the approach briefing should include, among other items, "the landing flap setting...target airspeed...autobrake level (if desired) consistent with runway length, desired stopping distance, and any special problems." The airline's crew resource management procedures tasked the non-flying pilot to be supportive of the flying pilot and to back him up if pertinent items were omitted from the approach briefing.
Aircraft Component Evaluation
Maintenance, repair history, and functionality of various components associated with the airplane's directional control systems were evaluated, including the brake system, the nose landing gear strut and wheels, the brakes, the antiskid system, the thrust levers and reversers, and the throttle control unit. No discrepancies were found regarding these components.