1 fatality

26 May 2010: SCHWEIZER 269C-1 (N73SJ) — Blue Hill Helicopters — Boxborough, MA

Boxborough, MA, United States

On 26 May 2010, a SCHWEIZER 269C-1 (registration N73SJ) operated by Blue Hill Helicopters was involved in an aviation accident near Boxborough, MA. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The FAA inspector's rapid reduction of power which resulted in a loss of engine power and his decision to initiate a turn during the autorotation without sufficient altitude to clear obstacles. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On May 26, 2010, a Schweizer 269C-1 helicopter, N73SJ, operated by Blue Hill Helicopters, was substantially damaged after impacting terrain in Boxborough, Massachusetts. The FAA check pilot was fatally injured; the commercial pilot applicant suffered serious injuries. The flight was a CFI checkride under Part 91.

History of Flight

On May 26, 2010, at 1645 eastern daylight time, a Schweizer 269C-1 helicopter, registration N73SJ, operated by Blue Hill Helicopters, was substantially damaged during an impact with terrain in Boxborough, Massachusetts. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) check pilot was fatally injured and the certificated commercial pilot received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the instructional flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The flight was a practical examination for the commercial pilot to obtain her flight instructor certificate, administered by the FAA check pilot. The checkride began at Laurence Hanscom Field Airport (BED) in Bedford, Massachusetts. A designated pilot examiner (DPE) accompanied the commercial pilot for two touchdown autorotation maneuvers, which the FAA check pilot observed from the ground due to FAA policy. After the autorotations, the DPE exited and the FAA check pilot boarded.

The commercial pilot departed BED and flew toward Minuteman Airfield (6B6) in Stow, Massachusetts. En route, she performed a "settling with power" maneuver. At 6B6, she completed hovering flight, steep approaches, and normal approaches. After departing 6B6, the FAA check pilot stated, "ok we’re done, let’s go home." The commercial pilot turned toward BED. The FAA check pilot then said, "this will be a simulated engine failure," and chopped the throttle. The commercial pilot lowered the collective; the rotor RPM gauge read "good," but the engine RPM gauge read "0." She told the check pilot she thought they had a real engine failure. The check pilot said "recover," and she rolled on the throttle with no response. The check pilot joined her on the controls and continued troubleshooting.

The commercial pilot selected a straight section of road for a forced landing, with a parking lot and field as alternatives. She noted calm winds at 6B6. During the descent, the check pilot asked where she was going and stated they needed to turn right into the wind. The commercial pilot thought the landing surface was more important. This exchange occurred several times. The next thing she remembered, the helicopter faced right, and she saw trees they were about to hit. She announced the impending impact, and the check pilot confirmed. The helicopter struck trees.

First responders extracted the commercial pilot, who stated to firefighters that during a simulated engine stall, the engine actually stalled. She said she attempted to land on a road, but the examiner instructed her to turn into the wind, and later took control. She told the examiner they would hit trees, and he agreed.

Radar data showed the helicopter at 1637 near Minuteman Airport, climbing to 2,500 feet while turning. In the final 60 seconds, it made a 180-degree turn, descended from 2,500 to 700 feet, then the target was lost about 300 feet from the crash site.

A witness in a parking lot saw the helicopter headed south, then turn 180 degrees north and descend out of view. It briefly reappeared above trees, then descended into them. He heard a woman yell for help. Two other witnesses heard the engine "sputtering" and "cutting in and out" before the helicopter turned away from trees toward a field and descended.

Personnel Information

The FAA inspector held a flight instructor certificate with multiple ratings, an airline transport pilot certificate, and a second-class medical certificate issued May 19, 2009, reporting 8,865 total flight hours. He joined the Boston Flight Standards District Office on June 23, 2008. His logbook showed 8,898 total hours as of May 25, 2010. He had 2.3 hours in the accident make and model, logged in four flights between January 2009 and January 2010. Since FAA employment, he logged 77 total hours, including 27.9 hours of pilot-in-command. The accident flight was his first helicopter checkride.

The commercial pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter ratings. Her first-class medical was issued March 24, 2009, reporting 80 total hours. Her logbook showed 206 total helicopter hours. She completed her instrument rating checkride December 19, 2009, and commercial pilot checkride March 20, 2010. She had 128 hours in the accident make and model, 29.6 hours in the previous 90 days, and 8 hours in the previous 30 days.

Aircraft Information

The helicopter was manufactured in 2008 and had 957 total aircraft hours. A 100-hour inspection was completed April 12, 2010, at 875 hours. The transponder was tested on the accident day at 956.2 hours. The operator departed Norwood Airport (OWD) that morning with 30 gallons of fuel for the 18-mile flight to BED.

Meteorological Information

At 1656, weather at BED (133 feet elevation) reported wind from 340 degrees at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 34°C, dew point 17°C, altimeter 29.66 inHg. Estimated density altitude was 2,869 feet.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The helicopter impacted the edge of a wooded area about 50 yards from a field, on a heading of approximately 300 degrees. All components were in a compact area; no wreckage path existed. The helicopter came to rest upright, leaning 45 degrees right. The right side showed lateral crushing; the canopy was fragmented. The vertical speed indicator read 0 fpm; altimeter read 50 feet with 29.66 in the Kollsman window. The throttle was idle with friction off; collective in mid-range. Both cyclic controls were separated at their bases. The tail boom separated at the fuselage; tail rotor drive shaft separated in two pieces with torsional overload fractures. The tail boom and tail rotor showed minimal damage. Main rotor blades had no leading edge damage; one blade was bent aft about one foot from the hub. Flight control continuity was confirmed. The engine was test-run and started immediately, accelerated smoothly, and ran continuously at 1,600 RPM. Spark plugs showed normal wear; borescope examination revealed no anomalies.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy on the FAA check pilot was performed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Chief Medical Examiner on May 27, 2010. Toxicological testing by the FAA Bioaeronautical Research Laboratory was negative for drugs or alcohol.

Additional Information

FAA Order 4040.9D required inspectors to complete at least one check flight every 12 months in each aircraft category; no make/model currency was required. The Event Based Currency (EBC) Program required quarterly proficiency in specific tasks, including autorotation to power recovery and touchdown autorotations for ASIs giving single-engine CFI checks. The accident inspector completed his most recent 4040 check flight on January 25, 2010, in a Bell 206, and was not approved for touchdown autorotations at that time, though he had been approved in 2009. For CFI checkrides, an inspector not authorized for touchdown autorotations would allow the candidate to perform the maneuver with a DPE or safety pilot.

Designated pilot examiners were required to have at least 5 hours of PIC time in the specific make and model.

The FAA had no risk management policy for inspectors evaluating risks during evaluations in aircraft with limited experience.

The CFI Practical Test Standards required the examiner to direct the applicant to demonstrate a simulated power failure at altitude and terminate with a power recovery at a safe altitude. The PTS did not instruct examiners to initiate a simulated engine failure.

The flight school's published procedures prohibited throttle chops with primary students and required a controlled throttle roll-off with warning ("3, 2, 1 engine failure") and recovery by no less than 500 feet AGL.

The Schweizer 300CB Pilot's Flight Manual warned: "AVOID THROTTLE CHOPS TO FULL IDLE ABOVE 3750 FEET DENSITY ALTITUDE, TO AVOID POSSIBILITY OF ENGINE STOPPAGE."

Contributing factors

Causes

FAA or designated personnel

Other contributing factors

FAA/Regulator