What happened
On April 12, 2013, an Air India A-319, registration VT-SCL, was completing a scheduled flight from Abu Dhabi to Mumbai. Prior to the aircraft's arrival, air traffic controllers had ordered two inspection vehicles onto runway 27 to check for bird strike debris. While the vehicles were still on the runway, the aircraft approached for landing.
As the aircraft transitioned from approach radar to tower frequency, the flight crew ceased all radio transmissions. Despite the tower controller issuing multiple calls and an explicit instruction to perform a go-around due to the ongoing runway inspection, the crew did not respond. The aircraft continued its descent and landed safely on runway 27. There were no injuries to the 81 passengers or the crew, and no damage was sustained by the aircraft.
The investigation
AAIB India examined the communication logs and flight data, establishing that the crew had acknowledged the hand-off to the tower frequency but failed to make any further transmissions for approximately four minutes prior to touchdown. The investigation noted that the crew observed the inspection vehicles at roughly 900 feet altitude. The pilots had pre-briefed a plan to abort the approach at a decision altitude of 230 feet if the vehicles did not clear the runway; because the vehicles vacated the runway by 500 feet, the crew proceeded to land.
Investigators also looked into the radio communication failure. The crew reported experiencing significant interference and garbling on the tower frequency, which prevented them from establishing contact. They also noted that they followed local procedures for communication failure, which suggested continuing the approach if the landing was visual.
Findings
- The flight crew failed to communicate with ATC on any available frequency after being handed over to the tower.
- The crew proceeded to land despite receiving a specific instruction to go around.
- Crew fatigue during the window of circadian low contributed to the operational errors.
- There was a discrepancy in mental models: the controller assumed a loss of communication would trigger a go-around, while the pilots expected to land if visual contact was maintained.
- The controllers were proficient in radio communication failure (RCF) procedures for the en-route phase but lacked specific training for aircraft on the final approach track.
- There was no established procedure for conducting runway inspections using two vehicles at Mumbai airport at the time.