Casualties unknown

2005-02-09: Airbus A340-642 (G-VATL) — En-route from Hong Kong to London Heathrow, GB

En-route from Hong Kong to London Heathrow, GB

On February 9, 2005, an Airbus A340-642 (registration G-VATL) was involved in an aviation accident near En-route from Hong Kong to London Heathrow, GB. This summary draws on records from the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)Primary reportUpdated 1785053200Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered G-VATL
Aircraft registered G-VATL. Photo: Mark Harkin / CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On 8 February 2005, an Airbus A340-642 (G-VATL) experienced fuel system anomalies while en route from Hong Kong to London Heathrow. The AAIB investigation examined fuel control computer faults, display discrepancies, and previous similar events.

Background

On 8 February 2005, an Airbus A340-642, registration G-VATL, was en route from Hong Kong to London Heathrow when it experienced an incident. The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) conducted an investigation and published report 4/2007.

Aircraft Information

The aircraft was equipped with a fuel system consisting of multiple tanks, pumps, and valves, controlled by two Fuel Control and Management Computers (FCMCs). The fuel system included a System Display (SD) page for monitoring fuel quantities and transfer status. The flight warning system provided alerts for low fuel level, collector cell not full, pump low pressure, and transfer warnings.

Flight Details

The incident occurred during the cruise phase of the flight. The flight crew observed fuel-related warnings and indications on the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) and system displays. The exact sequence of events is detailed in the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder information.

Investigation

Post-incident examination of the aircraft was conducted in Amsterdam and later at London Heathrow. The FCMCs, Flight Warning Computers (FWCs), System Data Acquisition Concentrators (SDACs), and Display Management Computers (DMCs) were removed and tested. Additional tests were performed on the FCMCs and FDCs, as well as scenario testing by component manufacturers. The investigation also reviewed previous fuel management incidents in Airbus aircraft and analyzed the frequency of 'FCMC1(2) FAULT' events. Operational information and flight crew advice following FCMC faults were considered. The fuel system design, including automatic and manual fuel transfer controls, was examined. Regulations related to fuel systems were reviewed.

Findings

The investigation did not explicitly state a probable cause. The report focused on the technical aspects of the fuel system and the occurrence of fault indications.

Conclusion

The AAIB report provides factual information on the incident, system design, and investigation results without assigning a definitive cause.