7 fatalities

Fatal Takeoff Accident Involving MKA1602 at Halifax International Airport (9G-MKJ)

Halifax-Stanfield, CanadaTakeoff (climb)

On October 14, 2004, a Boeing 747-200 (registration 9G-MKJ) operated by MK Airlines was involved in an aviation accident near Halifax-Stanfield, Canada during takeoff. 7 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The Bradley take-off weight was likely used to generate the Halifax take-off performance data, resulting in incorrect V speeds and thrust setting being transcribed to the take-off data card. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 10 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered 9G-MKJ
Aircraft registered 9G-MKJ. Photo: Adrian Pingstone / Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

MKA1602 crashed after takeoff from Halifax International Airport due to incorrect performance data and crew fatigue. The aircraft struck a berm, lost its tail, and burned, killing all seven crew members on board.

Incident Overview and Sequence of Events On the morning of the occurrence, MKA1602 landed on Runway 24 at Halifax International Airport at 0512 and taxied to the ramp. After shutdown, loading operations began. During this period, two MK Airlines Limited crew members were observed sleeping in the upper deck passenger seats. Following the completion of fuelling, a ground engineer checked the aircraft fuelling panel and signed the fuel ticket. The aircraft had been uploaded with 72,062 kg of fuel, bringing the total fuel load to 89,400 kg. The ground engineer then moved to the main cargo deck to assist with loading. Once loading was complete, the ramp supervisor for the ground handling agent went to the upper deck to retrieve the MKA1602 cargo and flight documentation. While the loadmaster was completing the documentation, the ramp supervisor visited the cockpit and noted that the first officer was not in his seat. Approximately ten minutes later, the ramp supervisor left the aircraft with the documentation. At 0647, the crew began taxiing the aircraft to position on Runway 24, and at 0653, the aircraft began its take-off roll. During rotation, the aircraft's lower aft fuselage briefly contacted the runway. A few seconds later, the lower aft fuselage contacted the runway again with more force. The aircraft remained in contact with the runway and the ground to a point 825 feet beyond the end of the runway, where it became airborne and flew a distance of 325 feet. The lower aft fuselage then struck an earthen berm supporting an instrument landing system (ILS) localizer antenna. The aircraft's tail separated on impact, and the rest of the aircraft continued in the air for another 1,200 feet before it struck terrain and burst into flames. The final impact occurred at latitude 44°52'51'' N and longitude 063°30'31'' W, approximately 2,500 feet past the departure end of Runway 24, at an elevation of 403 feet above sea level. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. All seven crew members on board were fatally injured.

Probable cause

The Bradley take-off weight was likely used to generate the Halifax take-off performance data, resulting in incorrect V speeds and thrust setting being transcribed to the take-off data card. The incorrect V speeds and thrust setting were too low to enable the aircraft to take off safely for the actual weight of the aircraft. It is likely that the flight crew member who used the Boeing Laptop Tool (BLT) to generate take-off performance data did not recognize that the data were incorrect for the planned take-off weight in Halifax. It is most likely that the crew did not adhere to the operator's procedures for an independent check of the take-off data card. The pilots of MKA1602 did not carry out the gross error check in accordance with the company's standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the incorrect take-off performance data were not detected. Crew fatigue likely increased the probability of error during calculation of the take-off performance data, and degraded the flight crew's ability to detect this error. Crew fatigue, combined with the dark take-off environment, likely contributed to a loss of situational awareness during the take-off roll. Consequently, the crew did not recognize the inadequate take-off performance until the aircraft was beyond the point where the take-off could be safely conducted or safely abandoned. The aircraft's lower aft fuselage struck a berm supporting a localizer antenna, resulting in the tail separating from the aircraft, rendering the aircraft uncontrollable. The company did not have a formal training and testing program on the BLT, and it is likely that the user of the BLT in this occurrence was not fully conversant with the software.