346 fatalities

1974 Turkish Airlines Flight 981 Crash (TC-JAV)

Ermenonville, FranceFlight

On March 3, 1974, a Douglas DC-10 (registration TC-JAV) operated by Turkish Airlines - THY Türk Hava Yollari was involved in an aviation accident near Ermenonville, France in flight. 346 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The accident resulted from the in-flight ejection of the aft left-hand cargo door due to incorrect engagement of the door latching mechanism before take-off. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-12Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered TC-JAV
Aircraft registered TC-JAV. Photo: clipperarctic / CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On March 3, 1974, a DC-10 crashed in France after its aft cargo door opened in flight, killing all 346 occupants. The cause was an improperly latched door and design flaws.

Flight Details and Departure On March 3, 1974, Turkish Airlines Flight 981 departed Istanbul for Paris and London. The DC-10 landed at Paris-Orly at 11:02 and taxied to stand A2. Of the 167 passengers on board, 50 disembarked. The aircraft was refueled and baggage was loaded. The planned one-hour turnaround was delayed by 30 minutes, and 216 additional passengers boarded, many due to a British Airways strike. The aft left-hand cargo door was closed at about 11:35. The flight received permission to taxi to runway 08 at 12:24, was cleared to line up four minutes later, and took off at approximately 12:30. The aircraft climbed to flight level 60 by 12:34 and was cleared to flight level 230.

Probable cause

The accident resulted from the in-flight ejection of the aft left-hand cargo door due to incorrect engagement of the door latching mechanism before take-off. Sudden depressurization disrupted the floor structure, ejected passengers and aircraft parts, rendered the No. 2 engine inoperative, and impaired flight controls, making it impossible for the crew to regain control. Contributing factors included incomplete application of Service Bulletin 52-37, incorrect modifications and adjustments, and the absence of a visual inspection through the viewport to verify lock pin engagement. Design flaws, including inadequate pressure relief vents and flight control cables routed beneath the floor, exacerbated the situation.