What happened
On December 8, 2011, an Airbus A340-312, registration CS-TOD, operated by TAP Portugal, was performing a takeoff from runway 10 at Aeródromo Antônio Carlos Jobim (SBGL) in Rio de Janeiro. Due to ongoing construction work, the first 1,270 meters of the runway were closed, resulting in a displaced threshold and a reduced available takeoff distance of 2,730 meters.
During the takeoff roll, the aircraft exceeded the end of the available runway surface and collided with obstacles, specifically the Approach Light System (ALS) lights and the Instrument Landing System (ILS) localizer antennas. The crew did not realize the collision had occurred and continued the flight to Lisbon (LPPT). Upon arrival in Lisbon, maintenance crews discovered parts of the runway lighting system embedded in the right main landing gear. The aircraft sustained light damage to the landing gear, and several runway lights and antennas at SBGL were damaged. All 11 crew members and 2 and 255 passengers were unharmed.
The investigation
CENIPA's investigation focused on why the aircraft entered the runway at a position that left insufficient distance for a safe takeoff. The investigation examined the aircraft's flight data, which showed that the takeoff roll began with only 2,095 meters of runway available, whereas the aircraft's performance requirements necessitated more distance. Investigators also reviewed the airport's taxiway configuration, the NOTAMs and ATIS information provided to the crew, and the taxi instructions issued by air traffic control.
Findings
- Infrastructure limitations: The runway construction necessitated a displaced threshold, and the existing taxiway geometry (specifically the angle between taxiways AA and BB) made it difficult for large aircraft to access the displaced threshold without using a route that placed them too far forward on the runway.
- Inadequate taxi guidance: While NOTAMs and ATIS provided information regarding the runway closure, they did not provide specific guidance on which taxiways large aircraft should use to reach the displaced threshold.
- Flight planning and situational awareness: The crew's familiarity with the specific location of the displaced threshold and the construction area was inadequate. The crew accepted taxi instructions via taxiway BB without requesting a change, which placed them approximately 600 meters ahead of the required takeoff position.
- Operational documentation: The flight planning materials provided by the operator did not sufficiently enhance the crew's situational awareness regarding the exact location of the displaced threshold.
- Air Traffic Services (ATS) communication: The use of generic taxi instructions and a lack of specific guidance regarding the displaced threshold may have contributed to the crew's incorrect positioning.