Accident at Seattle, Washington, 30 Nov 1947

Accident narrative

On November 30, 1947, at 1425, Alaska Airlines non-scheduled Flight 009, a C-54 airplane, went off the end of a wet runway at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport and collided with a moving automobile. Eight of the 28 occupants of the aircraft and one occupant of the automobile were killed. Seventeen aircraft occupants suffered injuries, and the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

### The flight

Flight 009 departed Anchorage, Alaska, on November 27 for Seattle, Washington. The crew consisted of Captain James E. Farris, who had 6,452 flying hours including 738 in DC-4 aircraft; First Officer Richard E. Whitting, with 3,220 hours including 1,483 in DC-4s; and Stewardess Reba E. Monk. The aircraft carried 26 passengers, 7,755 pounds of freight, and 1,875 gallons of fuel. Total weight at takeoff was reported as 63,000 pounds, which was within the maximum allowable.

The flight arrived at a planned fueling stop in Yakutat, Alaska, where one passenger left the flight. It remained there for two days because of unfavorable weather, standing in almost continuous rain. Difficulty in starting the engines was experienced on the morning of November 29, but once started they operated satisfactorily, and the flight departed for Seattle.

Fifteen minutes from a planned fueling stop at Port Hardy, British Columbia, the crew learned that weather at Port Hardy had gone below minimums. Because three engines were operating roughly, the flight turned back and landed at Annette Island, Alaska. Mechanics removed considerable water from the ignition harnesses and magnetos on all engines, and replaced all spark plugs in engine 1 and half of those in engine 2. All engines then operated normally.

The flight departed Annette Island for Seattle at 1041 on November 30, with Portland, Oregon, designated as the alternate airport.

### The approach and landing

Between one and a half and two hours after departure, Captain Farris left his station and took a seat in the passenger cabin. Leslie Greening, a former traffic agent with no pilot qualifications, occupied the copilot's seat while First Officer Whitting handled the controls from the left seat. About half an hour later, near Comox, British Columbia, Whitting requested Farris return to the cockpit to decide whether to land at Comox or continue to Seattle. Pan American had landed at Comox an hour previously due to adverse weather ahead.

The flight arrived over the Seattle radio range station at 3,000 feet at 1357. Farris reported to Seattle Radio that he had two rough engines, but he did not declare an emergency. The Seattle airport traffic controller advised that a ground control approach (GCA) could be made at the Naval Air Station at Sand Point, which had a 700-foot ceiling and 2-1/2 miles visibility. The flight instead made an instrument approach to Boeing Field, but abandoned it due to a low ceiling and visibility. Whitting remained in the left seat and flew the airplane.

A second instrument approach was made for the Seattle-Tacoma Airport. The airplane passed over the range station at 1,500 feet and flew a heading of 193 degrees toward the airport. It was first observed about 500 feet above the approach end of the 5,611-foot Runway 20, flying at an angle to the left of the runway. An "S" maneuver and rapid descent were made. A right turn was held until the airplane was over Runway 20, at which point it turned left.

The airplane touched down in the left turn, with the left wing so low that observers thought it would strike the ground. The first point of touchdown was 2,748 feet beyond the approach end of the runway.

Captain Farris, who had taken the controls when the airplane was in the left turn, stated he allowed the airplane to slow of its own accord to 50 or 60 miles per hour before applying brakes, and that he released the emergency air bottle 1,000 feet from the end of the runway. Before passing over the end of the runway, power was applied to engine 4 in an attempt to groundloop to the left. The airplane traveled almost straight ahead, went off the runway, crossed 229 feet of wet ground, and rolled down a 24-foot embankment. At the bottom of the embankment it struck a ditch, shearing off the left landing gear and wing, and collided with the moving automobile at the intersection of the Des Moines Highway and South 188th Street. Spilled gasoline ignited, enveloping the wreckage in flames.

### What the investigation found

Captain Farris and First Officer Whitting stated that engines 2 and 3 developed roughness about halfway to Seattle. Farris stated engine 3 became so critical it normally would have been feathered. Greening stated he was at no time aware of a rough operating condition. Whitting stated he noticed no malfunctioning of instruments or gauges during the approaches.

The Board concluded that engine roughness, if it existed, was present only in a very minor degree. The Board noted it was unusual that a captain would ride in the passenger cabin and leave his copilot with an unqualified man if engine trouble was being experienced. The Board found that neither engine trouble nor lack of fuel appeared to be a substantial factor, noting that weather at alternate airports in Everett, Portland, and Eugene was above minimums.

Prior to the approach, the tower reported a 600-foot ceiling and 1-1/4 miles visibility. Immediately following the crash, the Weather Bureau observed an indefinite 400-foot overcast, visibility variable one-half to one mile, and light rain and fog.

Examination of the runway showed the left outboard tire left a 105-foot mark starting at the initial touchdown point. The aircraft then left no marks for 60 feet. Marks from all four main landing gear tires did not appear continuously until 711 feet from the first touchdown. Both left tires and the right outboard tire were skidworn through the rubber tread and into the fabric; the right inboard tire was consumed by fire.

The Board found no evidence of mechanical or structural failure. Six weeks before the accident, the aircraft had experienced a complete hydraulic failure and the system was filled with a mixture of hydraulic fluid, coffee, water, and fire extinguishing chemicals as an in-flight emergency measure. The system was flushed three times but not disassembled. The Board determined this failure to disassemble the system did not contribute to the accident. Tests of the remaining fluid and brake components showed no foreign matter that would have impaired the brakes. The Board noted that hydraulic pressure was normal at the pre-landing check, the flaps extended fully, and the brakes operated effectively enough to skidwear the tires.

Tests conducted with a C-54 loaded to 55,000 pounds on the same runway—though under drier conditions—showed a braking distance of 2,144 feet from a touchdown speed of 95 miles per hour. Douglas Aircraft data showed that a dry runway landing at 110 miles per hour required 2,730 feet of braking. The Board noted that a wet runway would require greater distance.

The Board found the instrument approach was not made in conformity with standard procedure. Neither pilot had previously made an instrument approach to the Seattle-Tacoma Airport, and they flew a heading rather than a track from the range station, resulting in poor alignment. The Board concluded the airplane landed after half the runway had been flown over and at a speed above normal stalling speed, as indicated by the directional control maintained in the steep bank and the distance traversed before all wheels were solidly on the runway.

### Probable cause

The Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "the landing of the airplane too far from the approach end of a wet runway and at a speed too great to accomplish a full stop on the runway."