Incident Overview
On November 29, 2018, at 23:03 local time, a Vietjet Air Airbus A321, registration VN-A653, operating flight number VJ356 from Ho Chi Minh City to Buon Me Thuot, experienced a serious incident during landing. The aircraft's two nose wheels detached and fell. The aircraft came to a stop safely on the runway. The flight crew initiated emergency procedures and passenger evacuation. All 207 passengers evacuated safely; six passengers sustained injuries and were taken to a hospital for medical checks. Four of them were discharged on the same day (November 29, 2018), and the remaining two were discharged the following day (November 30, 2018) in normal health.
Emergency Response and Investigation
Emergency rescue operations were deployed immediately after the incident, coordinated by the Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam (CAAV) in collaboration with Vietjet Air, Vietnam Air Traffic Management Corporation, Southern Airport Authority, Airport Corporation of Vietnam (ACV), and Buon Ma Thuot Airport facility. The CAAV classified the event as a serious incident (Class B). On November 30, 2018, and December 5, 2018, the CAAV's General Director issued decisions 2265/QĐ-CHK and 2307/QĐ-CHK, respectively, establishing an incident investigation team.
The investigation team took the following actions:
- Suspended the pilot licenses of the flight crew of VJ356 in accordance with item 1.015(d) of Vietnam Aviation Regulation.
- Notified the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA), as the state of manufacture, according to Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention.
- Collected and analyzed related information, including flight documents, training records of the flight crew, aircraft documents, communication records between the flight crew and air traffic control, and conducted interviews with the flight crew.
- Analyzed data downloaded from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR).
- Conducted component expertise on the nose wheels, tires, and tie bolts at Collins Aerospace.
Investigation Findings
Analysis of the data yielded the following results:
- At a radio altitude of 9 feet, the pilot flying applied maximum forward input on the sidestick, resulting in a rapid increase in nose-down pitch rate. Consequently, the nose landing gear (NLG) touched down on the ground first.
- The pitch-down command effectively doubled the descent rate of the NLG compared to the descent rate of the aircraft at its center of gravity point, increasing the load on the NLG at touchdown.
- Analysis of NLG loads indicated that the NLG shock absorber bore an overlimit load, which decreased the shock absorber's damping capability during touchdown.
- Examination of the nose gear axle and tie bolts indicated that these components were affected by a very high impact load, leading to rapid failure. This resulted in consequential damage to the wheels and aircraft fuselage.
- The captain did not comply with the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) during the touchdown stage, specifically:
- At 110 feet RA, pitch-up inputs were applied to the captain's sidestick, causing aircraft pitch to increase to 3.8 degrees at 40 feet. Consequently, the aircraft's descent rate and speed reduced below the approach speed target.
- At 9 feet RA, the captain applied maximum forward input on the sidestick, an action that, according to the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM), should be avoided once a flare is initiated.
The investigation team noted that some additional activities need to be carried out for analysis, and the final report will be released later.