What happened
Prior to departure, the flight crew incorrectly programmed the flight management computer (FMC) with the wrong runway, entering 27R instead of the assigned 27L. During taxi, the captain identified the error and instructed the first officer to correct the entry. While the runway was updated, the first officer failed to input the necessary FLEX temperature or update the associated V-speeds. Consequently, the V-speeds were not displayed on the primary flight displays.
During the takeoff roll on runway 27L, the aircraft reached approximately 56 knots when an ECAM message indicated that the thrust levers were not set correctly. Although the operator's handbook required moving the levers to the TO/GA detent, the captain instead moved the levers from the FLEX position to the CL detent and back to FLEX. As acceleration continued, the first officer failed to provide the mandatory 80 KIAS callout because the V-speeds were not visible. At 86 KIAS, a continuous RETARD aural alert began sounding. The captain, unfamiliar with this specific alert occurring during takeoff, chose to continue the roll.
After the aircraft reached 164 KIAS and rotated, the captain decided to abort the takeoff. This decision was made after the aircraft had already exceeded the V1 speed of 157 KIAS. The captain reduced thrust to idle and applied a nose-down input at 167 KIAS. This caused the nose gear to strike the runway, followed by a bounce that lifted the aircraft back into the air. The tail of the Airbus aircraft subsequently struck the runway, followed by the failure of the main and nose landing gear. The aircraft eventually came to rest on the left side of runway 27L. There were 0 fatalities.
Findings
- The flight crew failed to verify the correct departure runway before pushback.
- The captain's decision to initiate a rejected takeoff after passing V1 speed was a primary factor in the accident.
- Poor crew resource management was evident, as the crew failed to communicate effectively or follow standard operating procedures regarding the thrust lever configuration.
- The lack of displayed V-speeds and the presence of cascading alerts, including the RETARD warning, contributed to the captain's loss of confidence in the aircraft's state during rotation.