What happened
On 12 September 2020, an Air France Airbus A318 (registration F-GUGM) was conducting a commercial flight from Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet to Paris-Orly. During the descent, the approach controller offered the crew a shortened route, which the crew accepted. This decision led the captain to execute a fast approach that deviated from the airline's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).
As the aircraft approached runway 25, the crew struggled to manage the aircraft's energy. While attempting to intercept the glideslope, the aircraft's vertical speed increased significantly. At approximately 1,0/00 ft AAL, the pilot's eyes left the instruments to look outside, resulting in a nose-down input that caused the aircraft to drop well below the glideslope. This maneuver triggered a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) glideslope alert and a Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) in the control tower.
Despite the warnings and the fact that the aircraft was not stabilized—with airspeed and configuration significantly deviating from target values—the crew elected to continue the approach. The aircraft eventually landed on the runway 380 meters from the threshold with an airspeed of 123 kt.
The investigation
The BEA examined flight data recorder (FDR) information, radio communications, and radar data. The investigation focused on the crew's decision-making, the impact of reduced flight activity during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the effectiveness of the operator's Flight Data Monitoring (FDR) system. The investigators also reviewed the radar vectors provided by the controller, which had placed the aircraft above the nominal glideslope.
Findings
- The primary cause was the decision to perform a fast approach on a shortened path, which created unnecessary time pressure and placed the aircraft outside the prescribed SOP profile.
- The crew's workload was high due to managing rapid configuration changes, radio communications, and flight path monitoring.
- A lack of recent flight experience due to the low-activity period caused by the health crisis may have diminished the crew's procedural adherence.
- The co-pilot did not perform the required call-outs regarding speed and flight path deviations.
- The operator's Flight Data Monitoring system was found to be insufficient in detecting non-stabilized approaches at key gates before the stabilization height.
Safety action
- The BEA recommended that Air France adjust its automatic detection criteria for non-stabilized approaches to better align with the reference system described in their SOPs.
- A recommendation was made to the French civil aviation safety directorate (DSAC) to ensure that the operator's monitoring system is more effective at detecting deviations from standard procedures during the approach phase.