Incident
On 30 December 2007, at approximately 09:27 UTC (11:27 LT), a Boeing 737-300, registration YR-BGC, operating as ROT 3107 from Bucharest to Sharm el Sheikh, collided with a stationary vehicle on runway 08R during its takeoff roll. The vehicle was used by the runway lighting maintenance team. The impact caused the aircraft to veer off the runway and come to rest about 137 m left of the runway centerline and approximately 950 m from the threshold of runway 08R. Emergency evacuation of passengers was conducted. No persons were physically injured.
Aircraft and Personnel
The aircraft was a Boeing 737-300, registration YR-BGC. The flight crew consisted of two pilots and four cabin attendants. The aircraft was carrying 117 passengers. The runway maintenance team comprised four workers with two vehicles, led by a team leader. Four air traffic controllers were on duty in the Otopeni Tower: GND/TAXI, EXE TWR, PLN TWR, and a supervisor.
Sequence of Events
At 07:53 UTC, the supervisor was contacted by the maintenance team requesting a long runway slot for cleaning the axial lights. At 08:49 UTC, the GND/TAXI controller coordinated details with the team leader. At 08:56 UTC, the GND/TAXI controller cleared the team to enter runway 08R. The team entered at 08:57 UTC. At 08:59 UTC, the GND/TAXI controller informed the team of an impending departure and asked them to be ready to vacate. The team vacated the runway at 09:04 UTC. At 09:06 UTC, pushback and engine start were approved for ROT 3107. At 09:08 UTC, a shift change occurred on the GND/TAXI position. At 09:08:48 UTC, the maintenance team requested and received approval to re-enter the runway. At 09:09 UTC, the EXE TWR controller asked what was on the runway and was told by the GND/TAXI controller that the maintenance team was on the runway. At 09:23 UTC, ROT 3107 requested taxi clearance and was cleared to taxi with a follow-me car to the holding point for runway 08R, without the GND/TAXI controller ensuring the runway was clear. After reporting approaching the holding point, the aircraft was transferred to the EXE TWR frequency. At 09:25:13 UTC, the aircraft contacted TWR and reported approaching the holding point. The EXE TWR controller cleared the aircraft to line up and requested a takeoff call, without verifying the runway was clear. At 09:26:00 UTC, the aircraft reported ready, and the EXE TWR controller issued wind information and cleared the aircraft for takeoff, again without ensuring the runway was clear. At 09:26:41 UTC, the GND/TAXI controller attempted to contact the maintenance team, asking "Runway clear, yes?" at 09:26:50 UTC. The team leader responded but did not transmit a clear message. At 09:26:57 UTC, one of the pilots said "What is flashing in front?" At 09:27:00 UTC, the aircraft struck the vehicle. At 09:27:56 UTC, the pilot informed the controller that they had hit a vehicle, were evacuating, and had left the runway. At 09:28:25 UTC, a member of the maintenance team announced that the runway was not clear and that a vehicle was on the runway.
Damage
The aircraft sustained substantial damage: the left main landing gear was torn off; the fuselage was damaged between the main gear compartment and the left rear door; engine No. 1 was completely damaged by the impact with the vehicle and the ground; the left wing was damaged along its entire span; and structural deformations occurred in other areas. The aircraft was declared a total loss. The vehicle involved (vehicle No. 1) was completely destroyed.
Conclusions
The investigation determined that the collision occurred because the aircraft was cleared for takeoff while a maintenance vehicle was still on the runway. No further causal analysis is provided in this summary.