No fatalities

Engine Failure During Takeoff Forces Aborted Departure at Sana'a Airport (F-BVGK)

Sana'a, YemenTakeoff (climb)

On March 17, 1982, an Airbus A300 (registration F-BVGK) operated by Air France was involved in an aviation accident near Sana'a, Yemen during takeoff. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The accident directly resulted from the uncontained explosion of a first stage high pressure turbine disk of the right hand engine. The propagation of a low cycle fatigue crack on one of the embossments of the disk rim was at the origin of the disk fracture. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 16 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards

During takeoff at Sana'a International Airport, a loud bang and vibrations led to an aborted takeoff. The aircraft came to rest with the right wing on fire, all 124 occupants evacuated with two minor injuries.

Accident Sequence

During the takeoff roll at Sana'a International Airport, the crew noticed a loud bang and vibrations when the aircraft reached a speed of 95 knots. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. The aircraft decelerated and came to a stop on the runway.

Damage and Evacuation

After stopping, the right wing of the aircraft was on fire. All 124 occupants evacuated the aircraft safely, with two passengers sustaining minor injuries. The aircraft was assessed as damaged beyond repair.

Investigation Findings

The official investigation determined that the accident resulted from an uncontained explosion of the first stage high pressure turbine disk of the right engine. The disk fracture originated from a low cycle fatigue crack on one of the embossments of the disk rim. This crack existed prior to the accident and was not detected during inspections conducted at the operator's workshops. These inspections followed the method defined by the manufacturer and the requirements of the airworthiness authority.

The investigation also revealed the need to reduce the intervals between inspections of these disks and to conduct two independent sequential inspections. Additionally, a design modification and progressive replacement of the disks with a new type were recommended. The limit life validation methods in use at the time were considered insufficient regarding the probability of crack detection.

Probable cause

The accident directly resulted from the uncontained explosion of a first stage high pressure turbine disk of the right hand engine. The propagation of a low cycle fatigue crack on one of the embossments of the disk rim was at the origin of the disk fracture. These cracks, which existed before, had not been detected during the inspection conducted in the operator's workshops, according to the method defined by the manufacturer and in accordance with the requirements of the airworthiness authority. The investigations showed that it was necessary, not only to reduce the intervals between the inspections of these disks and conduct two independent sequential inspections, but also to modify the design and make sure they were progressively replaced by the new type. It seems obvious that the limit life validation methods used at the time of the accident, were still insufficient, as far as the probability of non-detection of cracks was concerned.